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This study contributes to literature in three ways: first, it draws a full picture 
about the determinants of a firm’s voluntary disclosure decision; second, it aims at 
tackling the mixed results found about the relation between competition and 
disclosure; and third, it shows evidence that it is possible that a firm would change its 
disclosure behaviors across time. 
The examination is based on the concept that management’s communication 
could reach out to multiple audiences.  While a firm could be concerned about the 
responses from investors and competitors when deciding disclosure-or-not, union and 
government could also come into consideration.  In addition, how the concern about 
competitors would affect a firm’s voluntary disclosure could depend on different 
interpretations about competition.  Whether a firm is thinking of the abnormal profit 
that it has earned or the cost advantage that it has possessed, different interpretations 
about competition result in different predictions about the relation between 
  
competition and disclosure, and this could have caused mixed results in previous 
studies. 
Measuring a firm’s disclosure level by the number of information items disclosed 
within a year, I found that a firm would disclose less in the face of a union’s 
bargaining power and the litigation threat from outside blockholders.  Such concerns 
are even more salient when it comes to revealing proprietary information. 
In addition, I found that a larger firm would disclose more information about 
itself, proprietary or not.  Higher incentives for a large firm to give more information 
might come from both demand and supply of information about it. 
Furthermore, after controlling for other factors, I only found evidence that 
supports the argument that less competition (in the sense of market power) would 
cause less disclosure.  The results did not, however, show that a firm facing more 
competition (in the sense of barriers to entry) would choose to disclose less. 
Finally, the findings also indicated that a firm’s disclosure policy could be not as 
“sticky” as claimed in previous studies, especially when it comes to disclosing 
proprietary information.  A firm might change its attitudes towards disclosure in the 
face of different political environment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Management’s communication to the public reaches out to various audiences.  
Investors, consumers, government, competitors, and labor union, to name a few, are 
the parties that are influenced by managers’ information dissemination.  Therefore, 
when a firm has the option to disclose certain private information, it may consider the 
impact such information would have on all the audiences and how the reaction from 
all the audiences would in turn affect the firm.  In other words, a firm needs to trade 
off between benefits and costs when it makes a disclosure-or-not decision. 
Verrecchia (1983) points out such a concept.  In his seminal work, Verrecchia 
argues that, given the advantages and incentives of full disclosure, a firm might still 
withhold the information, even if it is favorable, due to possible harm that 
competitors, employees or the government would do to the firm by utilizing the 
information that the firm reveals.  The costs arising from disclosing such information, 
which is proprietary in nature, is referred to as proprietary costs (p.181).  He further 
exemplifies possible sources of proprietary costs (p.182): it might come from a union 
since the union would tend to make fewer labor concessions if the union knows that 
the firm expects to prosper in the future; it might come from competitors given that a 
firm within highly competitive industries would be more reluctant to disclose 
favorable news because of highly competition pressure; it might come from the 
government given that a firm within a political sensitive industry would be hesitant to 
divulge good news due to the possibility of attracting political attention. 
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Even with Verrecchia’s broad definition of proprietary costs, it is surprising that 
no study has empirically and thoroughly examined on whether a firm actually takes 
into account of multiple audiences when making disclosure decision.  Most follow-up 
empirical works have limited the determinant of disclosure to competitors.  For 
example, Clarkson et al. (1994), Harris (1998), Gleason (1998), Piotroski (1999) and 
Botosan and Harris (2000), using various proxies for competition pressure, seek to 
solve the puzzle about how competition would affect a firm’s disclosure.  They focus 
on disclosure decisions about whether to make management forecasts or how 
precisely to disclose segment information.  Other studies that interpret the source of 
proprietary costs as coming from more than or other than competitors include, for 
example, Scott (1994) and Bhojraj et al. (2004).  Scott (1994) examines how the 
consideration about the relations with a union (e.g., strike history) would affect how 
much detail a firm would be willingly to disclose about its defined benefit pension 
plan.  On the other hand, Bhojraj et al. (2004) investigate the effects of industry 
regulators on firms’ decision of voluntary disclosure within the electric utility 
industry only.  It is still not clear that, what role each target audience would play in 
disclosure decision, with all the possible target audiences intertwining. 
In addition, the findings about how competition would affect a firm’s disclosure 
decision are still mixed.  Verrecchia (1983) suggests firms within a highly 
competitive industry would be more reluctant to disclose favorable news.  Darrough 
and Stoughton (1990), on the other hand, predict more competition from increasing 
possibility of entry would induce firms to disclose more private information.  Later 
archival works find results that support either of the arguments.  Harris (1998), 
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Gleason (1998), and Botosan and Harris (2000) claim and find that firms within a less 
competitive industry would be less likely to report segment information in detail.  In 
other words, their findings are more aligned with Darrough and Stoughton’s 
prediction.  In contrast, Clarkson et al. (1994) and Piotroski (1999), using different 
measures of competition, find that competitive pressure restricts a firm from exposing 
more proprietary information, which is more consistent with Verrecchia’s statement. 
A possible reason for the different findings, as implicitly implied in Piotroski 
(1999), is that Harris (1998) only looks at the cost side of disclosure and fails to 
control for the benefits of disclosure a firm faces.  In other words, failure to consider 
the benefits of disclosure could give rise to the mixed finding.  Another possible 
reason, which is not indicated in previous literature, is that the usage of different 
competition proxies, which interpret competition differently, either at industry level 
or at firm level, could also cause puzzling results. 
Therefore, this study tries to fill the void by studying: 1) how the consideration of 
multiple audiences could possibly change a firm’s voluntary disclosure decision; and 
2) how the use of different competition proxies, which give different interpretation 
about competition, either at industry level or at firm level, could possibly lead to 
different results about the relation between competition and disclosure in previous 
studies. 
It is important to take into account of multiple audiences when investigating a 
firm’s decision process of voluntary disclosure.  It gives a complete picture about 
how having all the relevant audiences in mind would actually encourage or 
discourage a firm’s disclosure decision.  On the one hand, a firm would need to 
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consider investors’ reactions to its announcement.  If it is going to issue equity in the 
near future and if the information asymmetry between the firm and the investors is 
high (so the cost of raising capital is high), the firm could have incentive to reveal 
more news so as to drive down the information asymmetry.  However, the firm does 
not necessarily want to disclose all the news to the investors.  In other words, the firm 
might want to restrict the volume of information released, whether it is good news or 
bad news, due to the possibility of litigation.  If it is bad news, the firm could be 
concerned that its disclosure would trigger a class action from the investors1.  If it is 
good news, such as news that the sales volume of one of the firm’s products has 
reached the highest level among all years, the firm could still worry about the 
possibility of exaggerating its financial condition and inflating its stock price.  
Releasing good news would not cause litigation itself.  However, if at the end of 
period the financial results of the firm turn out to be slightly worse than investors 
would have expected, the good news that the firm has released during the period 
would become powerful evidence that investors could claim against the firm in a 
class action. 
On the other hand, the firm is concerned about the responses from competitor, 
government, or union if it is to disseminate critical information about the firm.  For 
example, a pharmaceutical company might hesitate to reveal the stage of development 
of its new drug.  Its competitor, by knowing such information, has incentive to 
accelerate the development progress and file for approval even earlier than the 
                                                 
1 In previous studies, how the consideration of investors’ litigation action would affect the firm’s 
voluntary disclosure decision has two sides of arguments.  Skinner (1994) asserts that managers can 
reduce shareholder litigation costs by disclosing adverse news early.  Francis et al. (1994), on the other 
hand, find that preemptive disclosure does not deter litigation completely. 
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company.  A retailing company would not release the information about merger until 
the deal is clear since it doesn’t want to draw unnecessary attention from the Federal 
Trade Commission.  An auto company might be unwillingly to disclose more 
favorable financial information (such as sales or net income) in the face of incoming 
labor contract renegotiation since this gives incentive to the union to bargain for a 
greater wage increase. 
In this study, I set up a model based on Verrecchia’s (1983) conceptual 
framework to test whether a firm considers multiple audiences in its voluntary 
disclosure decision.  To measure disclosure level, I focus on the number of 
information items a firm is willing to discuss in its announcements within a year.  
Following Miller (2002), types of information items vary from earnings forecasts, 
sales forecasts, preliminary announcements of annual sales, announcements of major 
contracts, announcements of stock repurchase to announcements of appointment of a 
board director.  I also further refine information items to those that are more 
proprietary in nature, according to the definition given by Dye (1985).  Such 
information is more likely to leak a firm’s strategic value. Therefore, the firm would 
be highly concerned if it were to release such information. 
I choose all firms, except firms within the industries with SIC codes 4000-4999 
and 6000-69992, as my initial sample firms.  In other words, I delete firms within the 
industries that were once under regulation.  Firms within such industries were under 
different regulatory pressure so they may exhibit different disclosure behaviors.  I 
focus on only one year (year 2001) and collect data cross-sectionally as opposed to 
                                                 
2 Industries with SIC codes 4000-4999 include transportation, communication, electric, gas and 
sanitary services, while industries with SIC codes 6000-6999 are industries of finance, insurance, and 
real estate. 
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across time to increase the variability in disclosure variable.  After applying for 
several criteria about data availability, the final number of firms used in the test is 
157, within 25 industries. 
The results show that a firm facing higher potential threat from investors’ 
litigation would restrain itself from revealing more news, no matter the news is 
proprietary or not.  The results also indicate that in an industry in which the union has 
more bargaining power, a firm tends to disclose less information.  Furthermore, the 
results provide evidence that a larger firm would be more likely to disclose more 
about itself, proprietary or not.  Finally, the results point out that a firm facing higher 
potential political scrutiny would choose to reveal less information in general, 
particularly in the period that overall political environment is less sensitive. 
With regard to the relation between competition and disclosure, the results 
provide supports on the argument that less competition, in the sense of market power, 
leads to less disclosure.  On the contrary, I do not find evidence that after controlling 
for the consideration of all possible audiences, more competition in the sense of 
barriers to entry would actually discourage disclosure. 
To further investigate whether a firm’s disclosure policy is as “sticky” as claimed 
in prior literature and to further examine whether how the consideration about 
multiple audiences in disclosure decision would change across time, I also collect 
data of a randomly-selected sample with 60 firm observations for another year, i.e., 
year 2002.  The results show that actually in terms of revealing proprietary 
information, a firm’s policy might be not as “sticky” as thought in previous studies.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that in year 2002 possibly due to Enron’s bankruptcy 
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filing in late 2001 and thus an increase in regulatory requirements from the 
government, corporate firms show their tendency to disclose more if they are more 
politically sensitive. 
Two related studies should be mentioned.  Gleason (1998) uses the Lerner Index, 
which she claims shows the combination of various forces such as suppliers, 
consumers, competitors and the government, and examines how it would affect 
segment reporting decision.  However, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to see 
how each force influences disclosure decision.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) look at 
the issue that, cross-sectionally what determines analyst ratings of firms’ disclosure.  
Although analyst ratings consider various aspects of corporate disclosure, including 
annual reports, quarterly report, and press release, it measures analysts’ perception of 
firms’ disclosure, not firms’ disclosure itself. 
This study contributes to the literature by: 1) giving a general and complete 
picture about what determines firms’ voluntary disclosure decision, especially the 
forces coming from government and union; 2) trying to provide another answer to the 
mixed results found about the relation between competition and disclosure; and 3) 
documenting evidence that it is possible that firms change their disclosure behaviors 
across time. 
The rest of study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 gives a discussion about 
theoretical background based on Verrecchia (1983) and provides a review of related 
literature.  Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses.  Chapter 4 describes methodology and 
procedure of sample selection and data collection.  Chapter 5 presents empirical 
results and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
In this section, I first describe theoretical concepts based on Verrecchia’s (1983) 
work.  I then review the studies that are related to the benefits of disclosure and the 
costs of disclosure separately. 
Theoretical Background 
Verrecchia’s (1983) main argument is that the existence of a proprietary cost 
prevents full disclosure, while the proprietary cost is defined as “the cost associated 
with disclosing information which may be proprietary in nature, and therefore 
potentially damaging” (p.181).  In the absence of the proprietary cost, investors could 
infer withholding information as having bad news in a company.  Therefore, 
managers would follow a policy of full disclosure.  With the existence of the 
proprietary cost, given that the information is withheld, the investors could not 
distinguish whether it is because the information is bad news or the information is 
simply not good enough to be disclosed. 
Verrecchia illustrates his concept of the proprietary cost: 
It seems apparent that there would be a proprietary cost associated with 
releasing information which is unfavorable to a firm (e.g., a bank would be 
tempted to ask for repayment of its loan).  However, the release of a variety of 
accounting statistics about a firm (e.g., sales, net income, cost of operation, 
etc.) may be useful to competitors, shareholders, or employees in a way which 
is harmful to a firm’s prospects even if (or perhaps because) the information is 
favorable.  One recent example of this is the response of the UAW (United 
Auto Workers) for fewer labor concessions in the face of an announcement by 
Chrysler Corporation’s chairman that firm’s fortunes had improved.  Other 
examples might include the reluctance of managers in certain highly 
competitive industries, such as personal computers or airlines, or certain 
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politically sensitive industries, such as the oil industry or foreign automobile 
importers, to disclose favorable accounting data. (pp.181-182) 
 
Therefore, Verrecchia implies that the source of the proprietary cost could come 
from union, competitor or government.  Altogether they comprise the forces that 
restrain the firm from revealing all the information. 
 
Benefit of disclosure consideration 
Previous studies provide theoretical arguments or empirical evidence about how a 
firm would take into account the activities within capital markets in its disclosure 
decision.  For example, Barry and Brown (1985, 1986) show that when less 
information is available about certain securities, such securities would be perceived as 
having greater risk and requiring excess returns.  A firm, to reduce risk premium, 
could do so through more disclosure about its activities.  Myers and Majluf (1984) 
claim that when firms have information that investors do not have, given that firms 
have some financial slacks, if firms decide to issue new stock, investors would 
interpret this as bad news or less good news.  Investors would not be willing to pay 
high prices for such stock.  Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) assert that more 
disclosure to reduce information asymmetry brings in a higher stock price, which 
means a lower cost of capital.  Such an increase in stock price from increased 
disclosure would be more salient in larger firms. 
Thus, a firm could increase its disclosure due to the concern of information 
asymmetry between the firm and the investors.  If it is going to issue stock, the firm 
has incentive to enhance its communication to the public to reduce the information 
asymmetry and gain a reduction of cost of capital. 
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In addition to the concern about information asymmetry between the firm and the 
investors, a firm may have incentive to increase its voluntary disclosure activities 
simply because of its equity offering in the near future.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
investigate what would affect the level of analysts’ ratings of firms’ disclosure.  
Analysts evaluate firms’ disclosure activities from three aspects: annual reports, other 
publications, and firms’ investor relations.  Among the factors they examine, which 
include firm size, firm performance and security issuance, they find that if a firm is 
going to issue debt or equity in the current year or in the next two years, the firm 
enjoys higher analysts rating, which implies that the firm might be more active in its 
disclosure activities. 
In a subsequent paper, Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that issuing firms 
dramatically increase their disclosure activity beginning six months before the 
offering.  Using the disclosure data collected from newswire, which includes all the 
management communications such as management forecasts, preliminary quarterly 
earnings announcements, announcements of new products, etc., they find that the 
increase in disclosure activity is more obvious in the disclosure category in which 
managements have the most discretion (e.g., managements expand and explain in 
details about what cause earnings increase).  The increase is still significant after 
controlling for the firm’s current and future earnings performance. 
However, focusing only on management forecasts, Frankel et al. (1995) did not 
find evidence that firms financing externally are more likely to forecast in the period 
shortly before an offering.  Although they find the firms financing externally tend to 
forecast more often than the firms not financing externally, such a tendency exists 
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throughout all the event periods, rather than just in the period immediately before 
financing.  They argue that it is possible that forces such as legal liability deter the 
financing firms from more frequent forecast around the time of an actual offering. 
Increased disclosure could lead to a reduction of capital.  Such a relation has been 
documented in previous literature.  For example, Botosan (1997), using a self-
constructed measure of disclosure level, which is based on voluntary disclosure 
provided in the annual reports of a sample of manufacturing firms in year 1990, finds 
that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital, for firms with 
low analyst following.  In addition, Sengupta (1998) provides evidence that firms 
with high disclosure ratings enjoy a lower cost of issuing debt.  Using ratings 
published from the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), 
he finds that both bondholders and underwriters examine corporate disclosure policy 
in estimating the risk premium to charge. 
In summary, a firm could expand its voluntary disclosure because of the concern 
about reducing information asymmetry.  It could also possibly extend the disclosure 
due to the incoming equity offering. 
 
Cost of disclosure consideration 
With broad definition of proprietary costs by Verrecchia (1983), most of follow-
up works emphasize on proprietary costs from product market competition.  
However, even the influence from competition on firms’ disclosure is obvious, it is 
still not clear in which direction competition would affect disclosure. 
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Theoretical works produce different predictions about the relation between 
competition and disclosure.  Verrecchia’s (1983) view is that firms in a highly 
competitive industry would tend to disclose less favorable news.  In other words, he 
predicts more competition discourages disclosure.  However, Darrough and 
Stoughton’s (1990), viewing the cost of disclosing proprietary information as an 
increased probability of entry, claim that more competition could actually encourage 
disclosure.  Verrecchia (1990) tries to provide an explanation about different 
predictions.  He argues that different predictions may come from different 
assumptions about the nature of competition.  In other words, Darrough and 
Stoughton’s (1990) model considers only pre-entry competition while Verrecchia 
(1983) implicitly discusses post-entry competition.  He states that “(c)ommon sense 
would seem to suggest that post-entry competition thwarts voluntary disclosure…” 
Even the common sense seems to suggest that post-entry competition constrains 
voluntary disclosure, empirical works still find mixed results.  Harris (1998), using 
two measures  of industry competition, which are the four-firm concentration ratio 
and a measure of the speed of profit adjustment, finds that operations in less 
competitive industries are less likely to be reported as an industry segment. In other 
words, her results are more consistent with Darrough and Stoughton’s prediction.  
She argues that “the segment disclosure choice differs from the annual voluntary 
disclosures considered in (Verrecchia’s (1983)) models.  The consistency 
requirements in SFAS No. 14 preclude changing segment definitions each period in 
response to observed earnings; thus, the segment choices represent long-run 
disclosure policy rather than annual disclosure choices.” (p.124) 
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Botosan and Harris (2000) also find a similar relation.  They claim that in a less 
competitive industry, in which excess profits (i.e., monopoly profits) are more likely 
to exist, managers, to protect their existing monopoly profits, would tend to disclose 
less frequently about the segment activities.  Using four-firm concentration ratio to 
measure competition, their results support their prediction. 
Gleason (1998) also documents a positive relation between competition and 
disclosure.  She uses the Lerner Index to measure a firm’s market power.  
Theoretically, the Lerner Index is affected by multiple forces, including competitors, 
suppliers or the government.  She estimates the Lerner Index as (sales – cost of goods 
sold + depreciation)/ sales.  In the paper, she claims that a lower value of the Lerner 
Index indicates that the firm operates in a more competitive environment.  She finds 
evidence that when a firm operates in a less competitive environment, the firm is less 
likely to voluntarily disclose segment information before it was required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
In contrast, Clarkson et al, (1994) and Piotroski (1999) find competition thwarts 
voluntary disclosure.  Clarkson et al. (1994) view competition coming from barriers 
to entry.  They use the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets to 
measure such a force.  If the ratio is high, a firm enjoys higher barriers to entry.  They 
find that with lower barriers to entry, good (bad) news firms are less (more) likely to 
include earnings forecast within their annual reports.  In other words, more 
competition, which takes the form of lower barriers to entry, discourages 
(encourages) firms from revealing favorable (unfavorable) news. 
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Piotroski (1999) also documents that competition affects firms’ disclosure 
negatively.  He uses return on equity, firm size and industry performance 
diversification to measure the effects from competition.  Each of them approximates 
expected future profitability, barriers to entry, and industry opportunities, 
respectively.  He finds that higher return on equity, bigger firm size, and less 
diversified industry performance are related to a firm’s willingness to disclose more 
fitly about its segment activities.  In other words, his results show that proprietary 
costs are increasing in competition and thus competition discourages firms from 
disclosure. 
These two studies, i.e., Clarkson et al. (1994) and Piotroski (1999), control for 
financial valuation factor that a company might have in mind.  While investigating 
the effect of competition, they also consider how the capital market consideration 
would impact disclosure decision.  This is different from Harris (1998), which doesn’t 
include valuation factor.  However, Gleason (1998) and Botosan and Harris (2000), 
also controlling for the consideration of benefits of disclosure, still find evidence that 
less competition leads to less disclosure. 
One major difference in these studies is that they use different proxies to measure 
the competition factor.  Each of these proxies interprets the competition factor from 
different perspectives.  In addition, gross property, plant and equipment, the Lerner 
Index, return on equity, firm size, and industry performance diversification measure 
competition based on firm level, while four-firm concentration ratio and the speed of 
profit adjustment measure competition at the industry level.  Table 1 summarizes and 
compares the studies that investigate the relation between competition and disclosure. 
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While most of the previous studies emphasize on the competition aspects of 
proprietary costs, Scott (1994) looks at the source of proprietary costs coming from a 
labor union.  He uses three measures to account for the effect from labor relations: 
number of strikes in the previous three years, average weekly wage rate for hourly 
workers, and firm’s average return on assets versus industrial average return on 
assets.  His finding is that consideration of labor relations would cause a firm to 
disclose in less detail about its defined benefit pension plan. 
Bhojaraj et al. (2004) is another study that interprets the source of proprietary 
costs as coming from more than competition.  Specifically focusing on the electric 
utility industry only, they consider industry regulators as a potential target audience, 
in addition to product market competitors.  Their results show that such regulatory 
concerns restrain a firm from disclosing more about its strategies to protect the firm’s 
existing customer base and its plans to exploit emerging opportunities under 
deregulation. 
Even though Verrecchia (1983) did not discuss the possibility that litigation could 
cause a firm to restrict its disclosure, such a relation is found in prior research.  The 
relation exists; however, the direction of the relation is not certain.  Skinner (1994) 
argues that one of the reasons that a firm voluntarily discloses bad news is to avoid 
litigation costs.  He finds that very bad news is preempted most often.  In other 
words, his results support the idea that a firm would be more willing to issue 
management forecasts given the concern that no warning about the incoming negative 
earnings surprise would be more likely to cause shareholders to sue.  Skinner (1997) 
also finds evidence that more timely disclosure is associated with lower settlement 
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amounts.  However, inconsistent with the idea that managers could reduce 
stockholders’ litigation by disclosing adverse earnings news early, he finds that 
voluntary disclosure occurs more frequently in quarters that result in litigation than in 
quarters that do not.  In other words, disclosing more often might not help the firm 
avoid the lawsuit. 
Francis et al. (1994) argue against Skinner’s (1994) projection.  By comparing at-
risk firms (i.e., firms that are in high-tech industries and experience severe declines in 
earnings or sales) and litigation firms (i.e., firms that actually are involved in a 
shareholder lawsuit), they find results opposite to Skinner’s (1994) prediction.  
Specifically, they find most of the litigation are based on an earnings forecast or a 
preliminary earnings announcement, not on an earnings announcement.  Meanwhile, 
for most of the at-risk firms, adverse earnings news is not disclosed until the date of 
earnings announcement.  Therefore, they conclude that pre-disclosure does not appear 
to deter litigation.  However, they suggest that “prior and concurrent disclosures may 
sometimes reduce the severity of litigation if not its incidence” (p.140). 
Field et al. (2005) aim at reconciling the mixed evidence on whether voluntary 
disclosure of bad news would deter or trigger litigation.  Using a simultaneous 
equations methodology, they find that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely 
to make disclosure.  However, using prior disclosure as an instrument variable, they 
find no evidence that disclosure would trigger or deter litigation.  After excluding 
dismissed lawsuits from their sample, their results show that “a firm could potentially 
lower its expected litigation risk by issuing an earnings warning” (p.505).  
Nevertheless, in their study, using prior disclosure as an instrument variable could be 
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problematic since a firm could face different pressure about disclosure in the year 
with litigation as opposed to in the prior year without litigation.  Therefore, prior 
disclosure decision might be not as correlated with current disclosure decision as 
claimed in Field et al. 
 
Chapter summary 
In summary, previous studies have provided partial evidence about a possible role 
that a competitor, a union or the government could play in influencing a firm’s 
disclosure decision.  A complete picture about the consideration of all potential target 
audiences into disclosure decision is still lacking.  In addition, previous theoretical 
and empirical works have produced different predictions about the relation between 
product market competition and voluntary disclosure.  One stream of studies suggests 
that more competition would lead to less disclosure, while the other argues that less 
competition would actually cause less disclosure.  Furthermore, how the concern 
about the possibility of being sued would affect a firm’s disclosure decision is still 
mixed.   
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development 
 
In this section, I develop hypotheses about what and who will influence a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure decision.  Investors, competitors, union and government are the 
parties that a firm might have in mind when deciding disclosure or not. 
Investors 
Investors’ perception about a firm’s stock is important to a firm since this is 
related to how much investors are willing to pay for the firm’s stock.  If there is more 
uncertainty about the value of the stock, investors would ask for more risk premium, 
i.e., they would be reluctant to pay a high price to buy such a stock. 
Managers could reduce such an uncertainty by revealing the information that 
investors do not have.  By disseminating managers’ private information that is not 
required to be disclosed, information asymmetry between managers and investors 
decreases.  Once information asymmetry between managers and investors is resolved, 
cost of raising capital can be reduced. 
Such a concern about investors’ perception is even more salient when a firm is 
going to issue equity to raise capital.  If a firm expects to finance externally soon and 
if a firm realizes that information asymmetry between the firm and investors is high, 
the firm would be inclined to divulge more information about the firm, such as the 
information about the progress of research and development, stage of merger 
negotiation, or preliminary quarterly earnings results, hoping to bring in higher 
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proceeds from equity offering.  Therefore, the first hypothesis is that (in alternative 
form): 
H1: If a firm is going to finance externally while information asymmetry is high, 
the firm would increase its voluntary disclosure. 
Revealing information to reduce information asymmetry is not the only concern 
managers have in mind.  One force that could affect managers’ decision is to avoid 
litigation, or at least to reduce the severity of litigation.  Involving litigation could 
ruin a firm’s image, and/or cost the firm huge amount of money to settle. 
If a firm expects its earnings or sales result is not going to be as good as expected, 
it could choose to be honest up front.  Therefore, once actual bad news is released, 
investors will not be so surprised that they will tend to sue the firm for not warning in 
advance.   Or even if they do sue the firm the damage would not be as severe as it 
would have been.  On the other hand, the firm might be concerned that such 
preemptive disclosure would actually trigger litigation since it brings investors’ full 
attention to the firm’s incoming bad financial news.  Thus, how the consideration of 
litigation costs would cause a firm to disclose about the bad news depends on how the 
firm weighs between the two forces mentioned above. 
The concern about the incoming bad news and possible associated lawsuits could 
also influence a firm’s decision about disclosing information that is not related to the 
incoming bad news.  The firm could tend to restrain itself from revealing too much 
(other) favorable news so as not to cause inflating its stock price, which would be 
even more likely to trigger litigation once the bad news comes out later.  It would also 
weaken investors’ claim that the firm has used false favorable news to inflate its stock 
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price, even if the lawsuits do occur.3  Given the ambiguity about the relation between 
litigation and disclosure, the second hypothesis is stated as (in alternative form): 
H2: Litigation costs affect a firm’s voluntary disclosure decision. 
Competitors 
In addition, a firm is aware of the relations with its competitors.  However, how 
the relation with competitors would affect a firm’s voluntary disclosure decision 
depends on how one interprets competition.  On the one hand, access to unique 
technology or ability to produce a unique product could bring in market power to a 
firm.  Such a market power would reflect in a firm’s excess profits.  To protect its 
abnormal profits, the firm would be cautious not to reveal the information that would 
cause damage to the firm’s market power.  Such information could include how the 
firm produces the product or the stage of development the firm is in for upgrading its 
technologies or products.  Since having higher market power implies that the firm 
operates in a less competitive environment, less competition in the sense of market 
power could actually discourage disclosure. 
On the other hand, a firm is also concerned about the threat of potential entrants.  
If barriers to entry are higher, potential entrants would be less likely to enter the 
market and the firm would feel less menaced by potential entrants. 
                                                 
3 For example, a class action filed on behalf of investors of Intel Corporation alleged that “as a result of 
Intel’s extraordinary bullish statements and assurance during July, 2000-August 2000, on August 28, 
2000, Intel’s stock hit its all-time high of $75-13/16.  But the positive statements about the strong 
demand for Intel’s products, Intel’s improved manufacturing processes and efficiencies, the successful 
development and introduction of its Pentium II microprocessor, the successful development of the 
Pentium IV, Itanium and Timna chips and the outlook for Intel’s 3rdQ 00 results, issued from July 18-
19, 2000 through the Intel Developer Forum, were false.” (Cauley Geller Bowman & Coates, LLP, 
2001) 
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Barriers to entry could come from at least two sources: capital requirement and 
product differentiation advantages of established firms.  If a potential entrant would 
need to invest a relatively huge amount of capital to enter the market and if most of 
the entry costs are sunk, it might choose not to enter.  Even if it does enter, the 
established firm could easily gain cost advantage over the entrants by increasing the 
quantity of production to drive down the cost and thus price.  Therefore, the entrant 
would be better off not to enter the market in the first place.  Another source of 
barriers to entry could result from the established firms’ product differentiation 
advantages.  An existing firm could have had spent a great deal in advertising or 
research and development in order to distinguish its products from others.  A potential 
entrant, in order to achieve the same level of product differentiation, would need to 
spend at least the same amount (or even larger amount since it has to induce the 
consumers to switch brand) as the existing firm.  Such product differentiation 
advantages build a barrier to entry for a potential entrant4. 
If an existing firm perceives a higher possibility for a potential entrant to enter 
due to lower barriers to entry, the firm would be more reluctant to disclose its private 
information, especially favorable information.  Such information could aid in favor of 
the potential entrant and harm the firm.  Since having lower barriers to entry implies 
that the firm faces higher competition pressure from potential entrants, more 
competition in the sense of barriers to entry could actually prevent disclosure. 
                                                 
4 Similar arguments about the relation between advertising expenditure and entry barriers could be 
found in Comanor and Wilson (1967) and Kessides (1986). 
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Since the relation between competition and disclosure depends on how one 
interprets competition, the third hypothesis is stated as the following (in alternative 
form): 
H3: Competition costs are associated with a firm’s voluntary disclosure decision. 
Government 
Another party that could influence a firm’s decisions would be the government.  
The government and its regulatory agencies could affect wealth redistributions 
between a firm and other sectors of the economy, causing political costs to the firm 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986, p.224; Whittred and Zimmer 1990, p.32).  The 
redistribution of wealth could take the form of “the imposition of special taxes or the 
granting of various types of industry assistance such as price support schemes, tariffs, 
quotas, direct subsidies, bounties, licenses and so on.” (Whittred and Zimmer 1990, 
p.33)  A firm becomes politically visible (or politically sensitive or exposed) if it 
“attracts a disproportionate share of scrutiny by politicians, organized groups such as 
trade unions, and the general public, making it a potential target for the imposition of 
political costs.” (Lim and McKinnon 1993, p.192)  To counter possible government 
intrusions, a company would employ several strategies, such as “government 
lobbying and selection of accounting procedure to minimize reported earnings5.” 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978, p.115) 
                                                 
5 Previous works that emphasize on how the concern about political costs would cause a firm to 
minimize its reported earnings or manage its discretionary accruals include: Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; 
Key, 1997; Cahan et al., 1997. 
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Another strategy to deal with political scrutiny could be to manage the volume 
and the tone of a firm’s voluntary disclosure6.  Through controlling the release of 
corporate information that is not required to be disclosed, the firm could avoid 
attracting unnecessary attention from the government.  Any information, such as 
impending merger plan or optimistic financial results, that would have a slight chance 
of causing sanctions from Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), investigations 
from Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or inspections from Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), the firm would be cautious not to reveal it or at least to disclose it in a slower 
fashion.  Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is stated as the following (in alternative 
form): 
H4: Political costs discourage a firm from more voluntary disclosure. 
Union 
In addition, the force from a union could cause mangers to alter their accounting 
choices (e.g., Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1991)7.  Such 
an influence from a union could reflect in a firm’s choice about whether to withhold 
information as well.  The presence of a union could form expectations about a firm’s 
financial ability through the firm’s disclosure.  Since such expectations could affect 
the outcomes of the bargaining between the firm and the union (Roth and 
                                                 
6 Lim and McKinnon (1993) and Baker (1999) also hold similar views that political costs would be 
critical to a firm’s disclosure decisions.  However, Lim and McKinnon deal with the disclosure from 
public sector entities, while Baker claims that political costs could affect variations in options reporting 
across firms (p.129). 
7 Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) investigate the role a union 
could play on a firm’s decision.  However, the decision they emphasize is whether a firm would 
manage its earnings during labor union contract negotiations.  Liberty and Zimmerman found no 
evidence of lower than expected earnings during negotiations, while DeAngelo and DeAngelo found 
reported income is lower during union negotiations, controlling for cash flows. 
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Schoumaker 1983, p.368), the firm would tend to avoid revealing news in order to 
lessen the expectations about the firm from the union.  Besides, during the negotiation 
process, a firm could claim that it is unable to meet wage demand from a union due to 
its financial inability, such as an inability to stay competitive or a possibility of losing 
profit margin (Carrell and Heavrin 2001, p.184).  Such a claim would not be credible 
if at the same time the firm announces favorable news to a great extent.  News such as 
that incoming earnings result is better than expected, or that the new product 
launching would bring in competitive advantage for the firm, would cause doubt to 
the firm’s claim about financial inability.  Furthermore, Elias (1990, p.619) finds that 
the level of settlements between the firm and a union could be higher if they both 
have the same level of information about the firm.  Therefore, a firm’s reluctance to 
unveil the news might come from the concern that it would lead to higher amount of 
settlements.    The fifth hypothesis is stated as (in alternative form): 
H5: Labor union costs discourage a firm from more voluntary disclosure. 
Firm size 
In addition to weighing between the benefits and the costs of disclosing (or 
withholding) information, firms of different size could also exhibit different 
disclosure patterns due to the following reasons.  First, differences in investors’ 
interests towards firms of different sizes could cause a large firm more willing to 
provide more information about itself than a small firm.  As elaborated in Atiase 
(1980, p.27), investors could be less interested in investing in the stocks of a small 
firm.  In such a firm, the scale of operation is limited; therefore, so is the amount of 
potential investment.  Besides, trading by informed traders would partially reveal 
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private information and thus limit the potential profits informed traders could gain 
from knowing a certain security has mispriced (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976).  Since 
the stock prices for a small firm could be easily affected (Atiase 1980, p.27) and it 
would be easy to spot the trading by informed traders of a small firm due to low 
trading volume (Freeman 1987, p.198), such a limitation would be even more severe 
for the informed traders of a small firm.  Therefore, an investor would be less 
interested in the stocks of a small firm and would demand less information from it. 
Second, large firms are usually involved in more business events and transactions.  
They commonly have broad bands of operations.  They generally make many 
products and distribute over large geographic areas (Buzby 1975, p.18).  Thus, large 
firms would tend to supply more information voluntarily because they have more 
events or transactions to report. 
Finally, large firms could disclose more because they simply could not possibly 
effectively hide their news.  Large firms are heavily followed by analysts.  Bhushan 
(1989) indicates analysts following is positively related to firm size.  In Gomes et al. 
(2004), it shows that average number of analyst forecasts for big firms (during the 
years 1997-2002) is around 10.  On the contrary, for small firms, the average number 
of analyst forecasts is just 1.  Besides, the news media are likely to carry news about 
large firms.  For example, Wall Street Journal could have mentioned Intel 
Corporation (market value of equity of more than 200 billion8) in 181 news reports 
while it indicated Friendly Ice Cream Corporation (market value of equity of nearly 
30 million) in only 3 news reports. 
                                                 
8 The figures of market value of equity are reported at value of year 2001.  This is more corresponding 
to the test in Chapter 4 in this study. 
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Due to the reasons mentioned above, the hypothesis about the effect of firm size 
on disclosure is (in alternative form): 
H6: Firm size is positively associated with a firm’s voluntary disclosure. 
Chapter summary 
In summary, in this section I hypothesize that a firm would consider the forces 
from investors, competitors, government, and union when making a decision about 
voluntary disclosure.  Specifically, I predict that a firm would increase its voluntary 
disclosure if it is going to issue equity to raise capital while it knows information 
asymmetry is high.  I also predict that forces from the government and union would 
prevent a firm from more disclosure.  I conjecture that litigation possibility from 
investors and competitive pressure from competitors would affect a firm’s disclosure 
decision but the signs are unknown.  In addition to the parties mentioned above, I also 
consider that firms of different size would exhibit different disclosure patterns.  
Specifically, I hypothesize that large firms would disclose more than small firms. 
I have developed six hypotheses that consider both the benefits and the costs of 
disclosure in this section.  In the next section, I would turn to the methodology used 
and the procedure of sample selection and data collection. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology, Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
In this section, I first describe the model used to test the hypotheses and the 
definitions of variables.  I then report the procedures of sample selection and data 
collection. 
Methodology 
The model used to test the hypotheses is as follows9: 
LDISC INFASY EQUITY INFASY EQUITY LITIGAit it it it it it= + + + +− + − +α α α α α0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4*
 
+ + + + +α α α α ε5 6 7 8COMPETE POLITIC UNION LSIZEit it it it it  
where 
LDISCit  = the logarithm of the number of information items firm i discloses 
in year t, which starts from the next day of the reporting date of 
annual earnings for year t-1 to the reporting date of annual 
earnings for year t. 
INFASYit−1  = information asymmetry for firm i in year t-1, measured as annual 
average of the logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread, 
which is the absolute value of bid-ask spread scaled by the 
average of bid and ask. 
                                                 
9 The cost of including too many independent variables in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression is the reduced precision of the coefficient estimates (Greene, 2000, p.338).  In other words, 
in the presence of the superfluous variables, the covariance matrix for the estimator would be larger.  
Given this, the least squares estimator in the OLS regression, however, is unbiased. 
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EQUITYit+1  = whether firm i raises capital from issuing stock in year t+1, which 
is measured as the amount raising from issuing common or 
preferred stock (COMPUSTAT item #108) in year t+1, deflated 
by total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6) at the end of year t. 
LITIGAit  = which is measured by two variables ( BLOCKit  and LOEPSit ): 
 BLOCKit  = the percentage of shares that are held by unaffiliated blockholders 
for firm i in year t. 
 LOEPSit  = a dummy variable, which equals 1 if basic earnings per share 
(EPS) (COMPUSTAT item #58) in year t is less than basic EPS 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
COMPETEit  = which is measured by the following variables: 
 CONRTOit  = four-firm concentration ratio in year t, measured as the total sales 
of top-four firms scaled by the total sales of the industry (4-digit 
SIC code) that firm i operates. 
 SPEEDit  = the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal profits for the 
industry (4-digit SIC code) that firm i operates in year t, which is 
β2  derived from the following equation: 
X D X D Xit n it p it it= + + +− −β β β δ0 1 1 2 1( ) ( )  
where Xit  equals firm i's returns on assets minus average returns 
on assets of the industry (4-digit SIC code) firm i operates. Dn  
equals 1 if Xit−1  is less than or equal to zero, 0 otherwise.  Dp  
equals 1 if Xit−1  is greater than zero, 0 otherwise. 
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 CAPINTit  = capital intensity for firm i in year t, which is measured as gross 
property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT item #7) scaled by 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6). 
 ADVRTOit  = advertising expense ratio for firm i in year t, which is measured 
as advertising expense (COMPUSTAT item #45) divided by total 
sales (COMPUSTAT item #12). 
POLITICit  = reported tax rate for firm i in year t, which is measured as total 
income taxes (COMPUSTAT item #16) divided by the absolute 
value of pretax income (COMPUSTAT item #170). 
UNIONit  = the percentage of employed workers who are union members in 
the industry (2, 3, or 4-digit SIC code) that firm i operates in year 
t. 
LSIZEit  = firm i's size in year t, which is measured as the logarithm of the 
multiple of common shares outstanding (COMPUSTAT item 
#25) and the stock price at the end of year t (COMPUSTAT item 
#199). 
 
I use the number of information items a firm discloses within a year to measure 
the level of voluntary disclosure (LDISC).  I take the logarithm of the number of 
information items in order to mitigate scale problem.  Following Kasznik and Lev 
(1995), Lang and Lundholm (2000), and Miller (2002), types of information items 
include earnings or sales forecasts, preliminary earnings or sales announcements, 
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operating activities announcements, financing activities announcements, and other 
miscellaneous announcements.  A detail list of information items is shown in Table 2. 
The information items in Table 2 only include those that a firm discloses 
voluntarily.  Before obtaining the list shown in Table 2, I leave out certain items even 
though they are found in a firm’s announcements through newswire.  For example, I 
exclude the items that are mandatory, such as the announcements that are related to 
the acquisitions of other companies, shelf registration, and changes in by-laws, since 
such events are required to file to SEC.  Furthermore, I exclude the items that are not 
mandatory but are declared by board of director.  In other words, I take out 
announcements related to dividend declaration or dividend payment.  In addition, I 
delete the announcements that may be related to independent variables used in the 
test.  Therefore, I drop the announcements that are related to lawsuits and equity 
offering. 
In Table 2, I further categorize disclosure items to those that are more proprietary 
in nature, versus those that are less proprietary in nature, since the parties such as 
competitors or the government would be mostly concerned about proprietary 
information.  According to Dye (1985), proprietary information is “any information 
whose disclosure potentially alters a firm’s future earnings gross of senior 
management’s compensation” (p.123).  It includes “information whose disclosure 
could generate regulatory action, create potential legal liabilities, reduce consumer 
demand for its products, induce labor unions or other suppliers to renegotiate 
contracts, or cause revisions in the firm’s credit standing in addition to that 
information which is, in traditional sense, strategically valuable” (p.123).  Therefore, 
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I classify information items within categories A (earnings or sales forecast) and B 
(preliminary earnings or sales announcement) as proprietary information and those 
within categories D (financing activities announcement) and E (other miscellaneous 
announcements) as nonproprietary information. 
Information items within category C are classified as either proprietary or 
nonproprietary depending on the nature of information items.  Based on the concept 
proposed by Dye (1985), the following information items are categorized as 
proprietary: announcements of order backlogs, announcements of joint ventures, 
announcements of write-off of assets or sales of assets, announcements of capital 
expenditure, announcements of major contracts such as purchase contract or license 
agreement,  announcements of research and development plan and progress, 
announcements of restructuring such as labor layoff or work hour or pay cutting, 
announcements of new product, product application or product achievement.  
Information items, such as announcements of building a new department or moving 
headquarter to a new location, announcements of giving award to suppliers, or 
announcements of using product suggestion, are set as nonproprietary.  Examples of 
information items listed in category C are given in appendix A. 
Following Mohd (2005), I use annual average relative bid-ask spread to proxy for 
information asymmetry (INFASY) between the firm and the investors.  In Callahan et 
al. (1997), they state that bid-ask spread, especially the adverse selection component, 
“reflects the degree of information asymmetry risk perceived by the dealer” (p.51).  
The dealer sets the bid-ask spread so that the expected gains from uninformed traders 
cover the expected losses to informed traders.  The spread would be larger if the 
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dealer perceives a greater possibility of trading with informed traders.  Using bid-ask 
spread to proxy for information asymmetry between the firm and the investors, I 
assume informed traders possess almost as much information as the firm. 
Following Clarkson et al. (1994), I measure a firm’s equity incentive (EQUITY) 
by looking at the amount a firm raises from issuing common stock or preferred stock 
in the next year.  I also add an interaction term (INFASY*EQUITY).  If the influence 
of incoming equity offering causes a firm to disclose more while the firm realizes 
information asymmetry between the firm and the investors is high, I expect 
interaction term to be positively correlated with LDISC. 
I use two variables, BLOCK and LOEPS, to measure a firm’s litigation costs, 
following Bamber and Cheon (1998, p.177).  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that 
blockholders, which are parties who already own a large amount of shares of the firm, 
could “bring about value-increasing changes in corporate policy” (p.462).  Their 
argument is that such blockholders are more willing to pay for the costs of watching 
the management.  Romamo (1991) then finds that a firm with a higher percentage of 
outside blockholders is more likely to be involved in a lawsuit.  Therefore, I use 
BLOCK, which is the percentage of shares that are owned by blockholders that are 
not affiliated with management, to estimate litigation costs. 
I also use LOEPS to proxy for litigation costs.  LOEPS is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm’s current year’s basic EPS is less than previous year’s basic EPS, 
and zero otherwise.  If a firm experiences lower EPS in current year, it is more likely 
to trigger a lawsuit by investors for inflating earnings in previous year. 
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I use multiple measures about competition costs to account for various 
interpretations of competition10.  CONRTO, which is the ratio of top-four firms’ sales 
to industrial sales, and SPEED, which measures the speed of adjustment for positive 
abnormal profits, are more in line with measuring whether the firms are within the 
industry that enjoys excess profits.  Put differently, these two measures approximate 
market power at industry level.  Another two measures of competition, CAPINT and 
ADVRTO, are more corresponding to the concept of barriers to entry.  CAPINT, 
which is the ratio of gross property, plant and equipment to total assets, and 
ADVRTO, which is the ratio of advertising expense to total sales, reflect sunk costs 
that a firm has invested in.  These two types of expenditure comprise a firm’s cost 
advantages in the face of threat from possible entrants. 
I use a firm’s reported tax rate (POLITIC) to estimate political costs.  A firm’s 
reported tax rate is measured as the ratio of total income taxes to the absolute value of 
pretax income.  By taking the absolute value of pretax income, I implicitly assume 
that no matter firms have positive or negative pretax income, firms with the same 
amount of income taxes expense or income taxes benefit would have similar political 
sensitivity. 
Measuring reported tax rate in the definition above is a common way a firm 
would calculate its tax rate and report in the 10-K reports.  For example, in the 10-K 
report for year 2001, Applied Digital Solutions Inc had pretax loss of $177,606 and 
provision for income taxes of $20,870.  It reported that it had effective tax rate of 
                                                 
10 Here I didn’t measure competition effect by using the Lerner Index, which is also one of the proxies 
used in previous studies to measure competition costs.  The reason is that in a preliminary test, the 
Lerner Index is found to be highly correlated with EQUITY (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.764) 
 
 34 
 
11.8%.  In the 10-K report for year 2000, with pretax loss of $33,985 and benefits for 
income taxes of $5,040, it indicated that its effective tax (benefit) rate is (14.8)%. 
Wong (1988) also uses similar definition to quantify political costs.  As claimed 
in Wong (1988, p.40), a firm (especially a very large and profitable firm) that pays 
little or no tax is susceptible to criticisms.  Therefore, I expect a firm with low 
reported tax rate is more political vulnerable.  If a firm with high political sensitivity 
would be inclined to prevent disclosure, this leads to a prediction of a positive 
association between POLITIC and LDISC. 
Here rather than using firm size, which is a common proxy for political costs in 
previous studies, I use reported tax rate to proxy for the political costs a firm bears.  
The reason behind this is that Ball and Foster (1982) question the construct validity of 
firm size to operationalize the concept of political costs.  They argue that firm size is 
associated with numerous other factors, such as industry membership (1982, p.183).  
In addition, Zimmerman (1983) finds that the relation between firm size and tax rates 
varies among different industries.  Viewing corporate tax as a component of political 
costs, such a result implies that at least in some industries, firm size might not be able 
to serve as a good proxy for political costs. 
However, as elaborated in the previous chapter, since the imposition of taxes is 
only one form of political costs, caution still must be exercised when using such a 
proxy.  By using reported tax rate as a proxy for political costs, I implicitly assume 
other non-tax components of political costs are negligible. 
I use the percentage of workers who are union members to estimate the costs 
arising from labor relation (UNION).  If a firm operates in an industry in which most 
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of the workers are union members, during contract negotiation, the union would have 
more bargaining power since it has broader supports from employees.  Since costs 
related to labor relation are increasing in the percentage of union-member workers, I 
expect UNION to be negatively associated with LDISC. 
I also include firm size (LSIZE), which is measured as the logarithm of end-of-
year market value of equity, to estimate the effect of firm size.  If the bigger the firm 
the greater the incentive to reveal the information, I expect LSIZE to be positively 
related to LDISC. 
 
Sample selection 
I choose all firms, except firms within the industries with SIC codes 4000-4999 
and SIC codes 6000-6999, as my initial sample firms.  Industries with SIC codes 
4000-4999 include transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services 
industries.  Industries with SIC codes 6000-6999 are industries of finance, insurance, 
and real estate.  I leave out these industries due to their special once-regulatory 
nature.  The firms within such industries could be under different (or stricter) 
regulatory pressure so that they might express different disclosure behaviors.  The 
initial number of sample firms is 5325. 
To obtain data about concentration ratio and speed of adjustment for abnormal 
profits, I require firms included must operate in an industry (4-digit SIC code) in 
which the number of firms is greater than or equal to 30.   This restricts the number of 
sample firms to 2323.  I further require firms included must have fiscal-year end in 
December to ease data collection.  The number of firms is reduced by 497.  After 
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requiring the availability of all related data, including all financial data, blockholder 
information, bid-ask spread data, and disclosure data, the number of firms is down to 
162.  I further delete 5 firms that either experience merger of equal, or file for 
bankruptcy, or change stock exchange, or being delisted from stock exchange, since 
such firms might exhibit different disclosure pattern than normal times.  The final 
number of firms used is 157 (Table 3). 
Table 4 gives a list of sample firms.  According to Francis and Schipper’s (1999, 
p.343)11 definition of high-technology industries, 102 (65%) firms are from high-
technology industries.  Based on the definition of industries that could have a high 
incidence of litigation, given by Francis et al. (1994, p.144)12, 125 (80%) firms 
operate in industries that could have a higher incidence of being sued.  As shown in 
Table 5, the size of sample firms varies to a great extent.  Market value of sample 
firms ranges from 5 million to 250 billion. 
 
Data collection 
I collect disclosure data from Factiva13 database.  The sources of publications that 
I focus on include Barron’s, Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones News Service, Business 
Wire, PR Newswire, Associated Press Newswires, Dow Jones Business News, Reuters 
News, Reuters Significant Development, and Major News and Business Publications 
                                                 
11 Francis and Schipper (1999) list the following industries (3-digit SIC code) as high-technology 
industries: 283, 357, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 481, 737, and 873. 
12 Francis et al. (1994) categorize the following industries as having a high incidence of litigation 
(p.144): biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961). 
13 Factiva was a joint venture between Dow Jones & Company and Reuters Group, founded on May 17, 
1999.  It was a combination of both firms’ interactive business services, Dow Jones Interactive 
(formerly known as Dow Jones News/ Retrieval) and Reuters Business Briefing.  It was acquired by 
Dow Jones in December 2006 and is now fully owned by Dow Jones & Company. 
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of the U.S. region (which includes many local newspapers).  I search all sources using 
a firm’s name and its ticker as key words.  Since the sources of publication I rely on 
are very inclusive, many disclosure reports appear more than once.  I keep the reports 
that are the most extensive.  Additionally, I include the reports that are initiated by the 
firm, and keep articles written or initiated by someone other than the management 
only if the articles include information that is released by management (such as an 
interview of CEO by news reporter or a press release initiated by the firm’s supplier 
in which the firm makes comments).  I read each retained disclosure reports and 
record the number of information items within each report. 
To more closely focus on a firm’s decision about disclosure or not, I also restrict 
to the reports that could be clearly identified as initiated by a firm.  In other words, I 
only keep those reports that have wordings such as “XXX Company announces…,” 
“XXX Company says…,” or “XXX Company introduces…,” etc.  I discard the 
reports that are quoted from management or if I have doubt about whether they are 
initiated by management. 
I gather all financial data from CRSP/ COMPUSTAT Merged Database.  Through 
NYSE Trade and Quote Database (TAQ), I collect data of bid-ask spread.  Firms with 
different ticker in these two databases are matched. 
To obtain information about the percentage of unaffiliated blockholders for a 
firm, I use a database developed by Dlugosz et al. (2004).  The dataset contains data 
for 1913 firms for the period 1996-2001.  It was cleaned for biases and mistakes that 
usually are found in the standard source of this type of data.  For the firm whose data 
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about the percentage of unaffiliated blockholder is not available from Dlugosz et al’s 
dataset, I then hand collect from the firm’s proxy statement. 
The data about unionization rate is generated from a database constructed by 
Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson.  This database, which is updated annually, 
provides private and public sector labor union membership, coverage, and density 
estimates compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The data within the 
database is given by industry, according to either 2-digit, or 3-digit, or 4-digit SIC 
code. 
I choose one year (year 2001) and perform Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression analysis cross-sectionally.  Previous studies argue that firms’ disclosure 
policies tend to be “sticky” (e.g., Botosan 1997, p.327; Field et al. 2005, p.495).  In 
other words, firms’ disclosure policies could be relatively unchanged over time.  For 
example, a firm would consistently make earnings forecasts over years unless 
uncertainties about the future prevent the firm from making reasonable forecasts.  
Therefore, I choose to increase sample size by collecting cross-sectional observations 
as opposed to observations over time.   I choose year 2001 because it is the most 
recent year that I could obtain data about unaffiliated blockholders from Dlugosz et 
al.’s database.14 
 
                                                 
14 However, due to the different nature of disclosure variable investigated in this study, I also collect 
data of a randomly-selected mini sample for another year (year 2002) to see whether any changes in 
disclosure behaviors occur over time.  I provide the details as the additional tests in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter summary 
In this section I set up a model to test the hypothesis.  I measure disclosure 
variable in two manners: the number of information items disclosed within a year and 
the number of proprietary information items disclosed within a year.     I chose one 
year (year 2001) and collect cross-sectional observations rather than time-series 
observations to enhance the variability in disclosure variable.  The final sample size is 
157 firm observations, within 25 industries (4-digit SIC code).  In the next section I 
turn to present the results from univariate analysis, Pearson correlation analysis, and 
OLS regression analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
 
In this section, I first present and analyze the variables’ descriptive statistics.  I then 
report the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables.  At last I show the results 
from OLS regression analysis for the main test and additional tests. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of disclosure variables.  The total number 
of information items that a firm discloses within a year ranges from 1 information 
item to 370 information items.  On average a firm discloses 34 information items 
within a year.  Decomposing into industry level, Table 6 (Panel A) shows that firms 
in the Semiconductors and Related Devices industry (SIC code 3674) have the 
highest number of information items (116 information items), followed by firms in 
the Prepackaged Software Service industry (SIC code 7372) (55 information items) 
and firms in the Computer Integrated Systems Design Services industry (SIC code 
7373) (37 information items).  All these three industries are viewed as high-
technology industries (Francis and Schipper 1999, p.343) and as industries that have 
high incidence of litigation (Francis et al. 1994, p.144). 
Restricting information items to those that are more proprietary in nature, the 
average number of proprietary information items a firm discloses within a year is 29 
(Table 5).  In other words, among the information items a firm voluntarily discloses 
within a year, on average 85% (29/34) are proprietary information. 
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Focusing on the information items that could be clearly identified as initiated 
from management, a firm on average discloses 30 information items within a year 
(Table 5).  Looking more closely at industry level, Table 6 (panel C) shows that the 
average information items firms discloses in the Semiconductor and Related Device 
industry (SIC code 3674) is down from 116 to 68.  In other words, in the 
Semiconductor and Related Device industry, on average 41% (48/116) of information 
items are not initiated by management.  On the contrary, the average information 
items in other industries do not vary much once I restrict the information items to 
those that are initiated by management. 
Table 5 also provides simple statistics of other variables.  The percentage of 
shares held by 5% owners, who are not related to management, is 16% on average.  A 
firm could have as much as 58% of its shares held by multiple outside blockholders 
or have no outside bolckholders at all.  Furthermore, four-firm concentration ratio is 
with mean value of 57%.  It varies from 38% (the Business Services industry) to 86% 
(the Computer Peripheral Equipment industry).  This indicates that most of the 
sample industries used in the test are concentrated.  In addition, most of the sample 
firms do not spend much on their advertising expenses.  95% (not tabulated) of the 
sample firms spend less than 15% of their total sales on advertising expenses.  
Moreover, union membership of sample industries ranges from 1.4% to 36.7%.  In 
the Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories industry (SIC code 3714), 36.7% of workers 
are union member, while in the Computer and Data Processing Services industry (SIC 
codes 7370-7377) only 1.4% of workers join union. 
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Pearson correlation coefficients 
Table 7 gives Pearson correlation coefficients among variables.  Information 
asymmetry in the previous year (INFASY) is significantly and negatively correlated 
with disclosure (LDISC).  This could indicate an equilibrium relation between 
information asymmetry and disclosure.  If information asymmetry between a firm and 
investors in the last year is high, compared to other firms, such a relatively higher 
relation is likely to continue into the current year.  Therefore, one is likely to observe 
a negative relation between information asymmetry (in the previous year) and 
disclosure (in the current year). 
Table 7 also shows that capital intensity (CAPINT) is significantly correlated with 
disclosure (LDISC).  They are negatively related.  Although Hypothesis 3 does not 
give predictions about how competition would affect disclosure, if the amount a firm 
invests in gross property, plant and equipment represents sunk costs that cause 
barriers to entry for potential entrants, a firm with higher capital intensity should 
enjoy higher barriers to entry.  As elaborated in the development of Hypothesis 3, a 
firm with higher barriers to entry (and thus less competition from potential entrants) 
should be more confident about disclose more.  In this sense, the result shown here is 
not consistent with the conjecture. 
The results in Table 7 also show that political costs proxy (POLITIC) is 
significantly and positively associated with a firm’s willingness to disclose 
information (p-value = 0.05), which implies that a firm under higher political scrutiny 
tend to restrict its disclosure.  Such a relation exists whether the firm is to disclose 
proprietary or nonproprietary information.  Furthermore, union membership (UNION) 
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shows a significant and negative relation to a firm’s disclosure decision.  Specifically, 
the relation is more distinct when it comes to disclosing proprietary information (p-
value = 0.026).  In addition, firm size (LSIZE) is found to be significantly and 
positively correlated with disclosure (LDISC) (p-value = 0.001).  Larger firms seem 
to disclose a lot more.  Although these relations are consistent with the hypothesis, 
the results are preliminary since these only represent simple correlations.  A 
multivariate analysis would be necessary to draw definite conclusions after 
controlling for the effects of other variables that might affect a disclosure decision at 
the same time. 
The results in Table 7 also raise the concern about multicollinearity problem.  The 
variables EQUITY and ADVRTO have a correlation of 0.51, while LSIZE has a 
correlation of -0.78 with INFASY.  Since multicollinearity problem would work 
against finding significant results15, the results in multivariate OLS regression 
analysis shown below are stronger than they appear. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: main test 
Table 8 provides the results from multivariate OLS regression analysis.  In Table 
8 (Panel A), it shows that, other things being equal, large firms are likely to reveal 
more information (t-values are from 2.99 to 3.29, significant at 5% level in one-tailed 
tests).  Such a result is consistent with the hypothesis and the findings in previous 
studies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  Large firms have incentive to disclose 
                                                 
15 With partial multicollinearity problem, type I error, which is the probability of rejecting null 
hypothesis while null hypothesis is true, is not affected.  Type II error is, however, affected.  If 
independent variables are highly correlated, null hypothesis will tend to be accepted with high 
probability. 
 
 44 
 
more.  The demand for information about a large firm from investors is higher than 
that about a small firm.  Investors could gain more from trading a large firm’s stock.  
In addition, a large firm also supplies more information because it has a broader band 
of operations.  It simply has a great deal of information to disclose.  Finally, the fact 
that a large firm discloses more about itself could be simply because it is too hard for 
the firm to hide the news.  The news media is watching closely at the large firm, and 
so are the analysts.  Therefore, a large firm has every reason to unveil more. 
In addition to the effects of firm size, the results in Table 8 (Panel A) also show 
that information asymmetry between the firm and investors is significantly and 
negatively associated with disclosure, when the amount the firm raises from issuing 
stock in the next year equals zero (t-values are from -3.01 to -2.34, significant at 5% 
level in one-tailed tests).  This indicates that if the firm does not expect incoming 
equity issuance, other things being equal, relatively higher information asymmetry (in 
the previous year) is likely to continue into the current year.  Therefore, in 
equilibrium, a negative relation between information asymmetry (in the previous 
year) and disclosure (in the current year) is likely to be observed. 
Table 8 (Panel A) also provides evidence that a firm could be concerned about the 
possibility of being involved in lawsuits.  Such a concern is more obvious when a 
firm has a larger percentage of shares held by stockholders who are not affiliated with 
the firm (t-values are from -2.79 to -2.33, significant at 5% level in two-tailed tests).  
Other things being equal, I find that litigation pressure coming from having a lot of 
outside blockholders could deter a firm from being a frequent discloser.  The 
information restrained could be an earnings forecast, or a product announcement, an 
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update about R&D progress, or simply an announcement about how to use company’s 
products. 
Using reported tax rate as a proxy for political costs, I find that the concern about 
possible political costs could play a role in a firm’s decision to disclose information.  
Specifically, I find that political costs proxy (POLITIC) is positively related to 
disclosure (LDISC) (t-values are from 1.65 to 1.73, significant at 5% level in one-
tailed tests), other things being equal.  This represents that firms with higher reported 
income tax expenses have tendency to reveal more simply because such firms think 
they are under less political scrutiny.  In other words, those firms who pay less 
income tax expenses or even obtain income tax benefits keep quiet about themselves 
because they expect higher attention from the government. 
Table 8 (Panel A) also indicates that a firm could take into account of the 
bargaining power from a union when it makes a disclosure decision.  Specifically, I 
find union membership proxy (UNION) is significantly and negatively associated 
with disclosure (LDISC) (t-values are from -2.07 to -1.69, significant at 5% level in 
one-tailed tests), other things being equal.  Such a result is consistent with the finding 
from Scott (1994).  However, since Scott did not consider the effects of litigation, 
competition and government, the result shown here points out that such a relation 
exists even after controlling for other factors.  In addition, the type of disclosure 
considered here is more generalized than that in Scott (1994). 
I find weak evidence that competitors would play a role in a firm’s disclosure 
decision, other things being equal.  Among four proxies for competition, only the 
speed of adjustments for abnormal profits (SPEED) shows a significant (at 5% level 
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based on a two-tailed test) influence on disclosure.  In other words, after taking into 
account of other variables that might affect a firm’s disclosure decision, I find support 
for the argument that less competition (in the sense of more market power) would 
lead a firm to reveal less to protect its excess profits.  On the other hand, viewing 
capital investment and advertising expenditure as two types of sunk costs that could 
cause entry barriers for potential entrants, both variables (CAPINT and ADVRTO) do 
not show significant associations with disclosure (LDISC).  Therefore, I fail to find 
clear evidence about the argument that more competition (in the sense of lower 
barriers to entry) would prevent a firm from more disclosure. 
In Table 8 (Panel A), the interaction term (INFASY*EQUITY) is not significant.  
Therefore, I fail to find evidence supporting the statement that a firm would increase 
its disclosure in the face of equity offering while experiencing high information 
asymmetry.  Such a result is more aligned with Frankel et al.’s (1995) results while 
inconsistent with Lang and Lundholm’s (1993 and 2000) findings. 
After restricting the attention to those information items that are more proprietary 
in nature, Table 8 (Panel B) presents results that are similar to Table 8 (Panel A).  
However, the concern about potential political costs seems not to have a clearly 
significant influence about disclosing proprietary information.  A firm could be 
concerned more generally, i.e., whether the information is proprietary or not, when it 
faces possible scrutiny from the government and other regulatory agencies.  On the 
other hand, Table 8 (Panel B) shows that the influence from outside blockholders is 
even more salient towards the decision about divulging proprietary information.  The 
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influence from the bargaining power from a union also plays a more distinct role in 
the decision about disclosing proprietary news. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: additional tests 
To measure more precisely about a firm’s disclosure-or-not decision, I also 
restrict announcements to those that I can clearly identify as being initiated by 
management.  Table 9 reports the results of multivariate OLS regression analysis.  In 
Table 9, the results are mostly qualitatively similar to those in Table 8.  Political costs 
proxy (POLITIC), however, shows a significant relation to disclosure (LDISC), no 
matter it is to disclose proprietary information or not (t-values are from 1.65 to 1.85, 
significant at 5% level in one-tailed tests). 
Furthermore, whether a firm’s disclosure policy is as “sticky” as claimed in 
previous studies raises an issue.  Whether what would influence a firm’s disclosure 
decision will change across time raises another issue.  To investigate these, from 157 
firm observations used in the tests, I rank them according to their permanent numbers 
and select two out of every five firm observations.  I choose year 2002 as another 
investigation year.  The resulting sample size is 60 firm observations, within 18 
industries (4-digit SIC code). 
   The first issue is to see whether the number of (proprietary) information items 
disclosed within a year changes significantly from year 2001 to year 2002.  The 
results (not tabulated) do not find evidence that the number of information items 
could be significantly different within these two years (t-value = 0.76, Pr > |t| = 
0.4520).  However, once I restrict the attention to those information items that are 
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more proprietary in nature, I do find some evidence that the number of information 
items is different from year 2001 to year 2002 (t-value = 2.04, significant at 5% in a 
two-tailed test).  Therefore, a firm’s disclosure behaviors in general could be “sticky”; 
it might not change from time to time.  In terms of disclosing proprietary information, 
i.e. an overall decision about whether to issue an earnings or sales forecast, whether 
to preliminarily announce earnings or sales results, whether to announce an 
achievement in a newly launched product, whether to update progress in R&D, 
whether to mention a newly signed cooperation contract, etc, a firm’s decision is 
more likely to change from time to time because of the strategic concern. 
The second issue I examine is to see whether what would influence a firm’s 
disclosure decision changes from year 2001 to year 2002.  I report the results of an 
OLS regression analysis for year 2002 in Table 10.  I report only the results that 
consider the announcements that are both initiated by management and quoted from 
management.  The results remain qualitatively similar even if I focus only on the 
announcements that are initiated by management.   
The results in Table 10 (both Panels A and B) still share some similarities to those 
of year 2001.  The forces from bargaining power of a union remain to prevent a firm 
from more disclosure.  A larger firm still prefers to reveal more.  A firm with more 
market power still tends to say less in order to protect its competitive advantages.  In 
Table 10, however, it shows that litigation pressure from big outside blockholders 
seems to play less a role in year 2002. 
  The most major difference from the results of year 2001 to those of year 2002 is 
that, political costs proxy (POLITIC) is now negatively associated with disclosure, 
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particularly significantly negatively related to disclosing proprietary information (t-
values are from -1.54 to -1.76, three of them are significant at 5% level in one-tailed 
tests).  This shows that in year 2002 a firm with higher political sensitivity would be 
more likely to discuss more information, especially proprietary information.  One 
possible explanation is that due to the filing for bankruptcy of Enron in late 2001 the 
government and other regulatory agencies are paying more attention to the disclosure 
environment of corporate firms than before.  Companies, in the face of increasing 
government scrutiny, would exhibit different disclosure behaviors by providing more 
information voluntarily. 
 
Chapter summary 
In this section I show evidence that litigation pressure, political scrutiny and 
bargaining power from a union could cause a firm to restrain its disclosure of 
information, especially proprietary information.  In addition, owning higher power 
could lead a firm to say less to protect its unique competitive advantage, while a large 
firm would prefer to reveal more about themselves.  Furthermore, I show that the 
disclosure of proprietary information could be not as “sticky” as mentioned in 
previous studies.  Finally, I find evidence that indicate a possible different disclosure 
pattern due to changes in political environment from year 2001 to year 2002. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
In this section I first discuss my conclusions.  I then describe the limitations and 
future directions of the study. 
Conclusion and discussion 
A firm could have multiple audiences in mind when it is to disclose its private 
information.  The results in this study indicate that the bargaining power from a union 
could play a significant role in a firm’s decision process of disclosing information.  
Litigation possibilities from having big outside shareholders could also be of certain 
concerns.  Such influences are even more obvious when it comes to revealing 
proprietary information.  The directions of influences are negative; they would 
discourage a firm from unveiling more. 
The mixed findings found in previous studies about the relation between 
competition and disclosure are also reconciled to some degree.  In this study I argue 
that the conflicting results are due to different interpretations about competition from 
different researchers.  However, I only find evidence that are more aligned with the 
statement that less competition (in the sense of more market power) would lead to 
less disclosure.  I do not find evidence supporting the argument that more competition 
(in the sense of lower barriers to entry) would actually cause less disclosure. 
A large firm is found to be more likely to say more.  In this study I argue that the 
incentives for a large firm to disclose more could come from both the demand and the 
supply sides.  Investors demand more information about a large firm because they 
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like to own the stocks of a large firm and need more information from it.  A large 
firm supplies more information because it has a broader range of operations and 
because there is no way it could effectively hide any news. 
The forces from the government also come to a firm’s mind when making a 
disclosure decision.  In the period with less political pressure, firms hide more about 
themselves to avoid further political attention.  However, once the overall political 
environment has changed, firms tend to provide more information, particularly 
proprietary information, to fulfill increasing disclosure demands from the 
government. 
 
Limitations 
The results in this study, however, are limited in two ways.  First, the number of 
information items a firm could disclose within a year, which is the disclosure variable 
used in the study, tends to be mechanically increasing in firm size.  This is because 
normally a larger firm would have more events or transactions occurring within a 
year.  However, using such a disclosure variable enables researchers to consider a 
firm’s disclosure decision more completely and generally. 
Second, corporate income tax only represents one part of political costs a firm 
bears.  In case political costs other than corporate tax are not negligible, the results 
about political costs hypothesis should be interpreted in caution. 
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Future directions 
In future study, alternative proxies for a firm’s concerns about its investors could 
be used to test the model.  Examples would include using stock prices volatility as a 
proxy for information asymmetry between a firm and investors.  In addition, although 
developing proxies for a firm’s consideration about its political costs is difficult, such 
an expansion could pour more insights into the study. 
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Appendix A 
 
Examples of information items listed in category C 
C1: Write-offs or sales of assets 
“XXX Company announced that its Board of Directors has authorized the 
company to spin off its YYY subsidiary….” 
“XXX Company sold its San Diego, California-based fully equipped and staff 
gene therapy manufacturing facility to YYY Company for 4.8 million….” 
“XXX Company announces that it will post a one-time non-cash write off of 
approximately $9 million associated with its investment in YYY Company….” 
C2: Order backlogs 
“XXX Company today announced it has received a multi-system order for its 
electrofill system from YYY Company….” 
“XXX Company announced today that its OEM sales division has received 
purchase orders from a Fortune 500 company to manufacture a new product line 
of high end audio/video cables.  The order size is approximately $1.1 million and 
deliveries are currently scheduled for the end of the second quarter and beginning 
of the third quarter of 2002.” 
C3: Announcement of capital expenditure 
“XXX Company announced today it has broken ground for a new $45 million 
semiconductor testing facility and design center in YYY….” 
C4: Announcement of new products, product applications or product achievements 
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“XXX Company today announced the introduction of the first over-the-counter 
line of dye-free, liquid pain relievers and fever reducers for children….” 
“XXX Company today announced the worldwide availability of the Zip(R) 250 
MB MultiBay Drive from YYY Computer Corporation….” 
“XXX Company today announced that it has reached a new milestone in silver 
sales with the shipment of the 300th S80 server, making the ultra-powerful UNIX 
system the fastest-selling high-end server in history….” 
C5: Announcement of joint ventures 
“XXX Company and YYY Company today announced the companies have 
formed ZZZ Company, a joint venture that will focus on the development and 
commercialization of new equipment and materials for rapid tooling and direct 
and indirect in-line manufacturing processes….” 
C6: Announcement of research and development progress 
“XXX Company announced today that the company will conduct clinical studies 
to assess the safety and efficacy of YYY in children aged 10 and over with type 2 
diabetes….” 
C7: Major contracts: purchase contract, license agreement or cooperative agreement 
 “XXX Company and YYY Company announced today a three-year agreement 
for YYY Company to license XXX’s Integrated Outcomes Database….” 
“XXX Company and YYY Company today announced a strategic technology 
partnership that will result in the development of technology aimed at the high-
speed communications market…..” 
C8: Restructuring: labor cutting or work hour/pay cutting 
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“XXX Company announced that it will cut about 20% of its workforce, 
discontinue or reallocate nonessential projects and cut discretionary expenses due 
to the economic slowdown and decline in capital spending….” 
C9: New department, new location or other operations changes 
“XXX Company today announced that it is consolidating the company’s two 
prescription pharmaceutical units into a single, unified Global Prescription 
Business Unit….” 
C10: Giving award 
“XXX Company today announced the eight winners of its prestigious Supplier 
Continuous Quality Improvement (SCQI) award for 2000….” 
C11: Using product suggestion, product-related event or other suggestions 
“XXX Company urges smokers this World No Tobacco Day to make a 
commitment to quit smoking or encourage family members or friends who smoke 
to extinguish their cigarettes permanently…” 
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Table 1: Summary of literature related to the relation between competition and disclosure 
Studies 
Disclosure issue 
focused 
Proxies used to 
measure competition 
effect 
Control for financial 
valuation factor 
The relation between 
competition and 
disclosure found 
Consistent with 
Verrecchia (1983) or 
Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990)? 
Clarkson, Kao 
and Richardson 
(1994) 
Whether to include 
forecasts in the 
MD&A section of 
annual reports 
Ratio of property, 
plant and equipment 
to total assets 
Yes More competition → 
less disclosure (for 
good news firms) 
Verrecchia (1983) 
Harris (1998) Report operations as 
a business segment 
The four-firm 
concentration ratio 
and a measure of the 
speed of profit 
adjustment 
No Less competition → 
less disclosure 
Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990) 
Gleason (1998) Report segment data 
voluntarily 
The Lerner Index Yes Less competition → 
less disclosure 
Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990) 
Piotroski 
(1999) 
The fitness of 
reported segment 
information 
Return on equity, 
firm size and a 
measure of industry 
performance 
diversification 
Yes More competition → 
less disclosure 
Verrecchia (1983) 
Botosan and 
Harris (2000) 
Report quarterly 
segment data for the 
first time 
The four-firm 
concentration ratio 
Yes Less competition → 
less disclosure 
Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990) 
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Table 2: Information item categories 
 Information items 
Proprietary (P) or 
Nonproprietary (N)a,b
A. Forecast 
1. Point, range and qualitative estimate of quarterly sales P 
2. Point, range and qualitative estimate of quarterly 
earnings 
P 
3. Point, range and qualitative estimate of annual sales P 
4. Point, range and qualitative estimate of annual earnings P 
B. Preliminary earnings/sales announcement 
1. Preliminary earnings announcement, quarterly P 
2. Preliminary earnings announcement, annual P 
3. Preliminary sales announcement, quarterly P 
4. Preliminary sales announcement, annual P 
C. Operating 
1. Write-offs or sales of assets P 
2. Order backlogs P 
3. Announcement of capital expenditure P 
4. Announcement of new product/service, product 
application or product achievement 
P 
5. Announcement of joint ventures P 
6. Announcement of research and development progress P 
7. Major contracts: purchase/supply contract, license 
agreement or cooperative agreement 
P 
8. Restructuring: labor cutting or work hour/pay cutting P 
9. New apartment, new location or other operations 
changes 
N 
10. Giving award N 
11. Using product suggestion, product-related event or other 
suggestions 
N 
12. Other miscellaneous operating-related information N 
D. Financing 
1. Equity buyback N 
2. Debt: financing N 
3. other debt-based transactions N 
E. Miscellaneous 
1. personnel changes---employee (fire, hire, promote) N 
2. personnel changes---board (appoint or resign) N 
3. community services, chartable contribution, awards N 
4. vague discussion of company/history N 
a. The list of information items categories is modified from Miller (2002) 
b. I distinguish a proprietary information item from a nonproprietary information item based on the concept 
proposed by Dye (1985).  He states, “proprietary information is the information whose disclosure could 
generate regulatory action, create potential legal liabilities, reduce consumer demand for its products, 
induce labor unions or other suppliers to renegotiate contracts, or cause revisions in the firm’s credit 
standing in addition to that information which is, in traditional sense, strategically valuable” (p.123). 
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Table 3: Sample selection procedure 
Selection Criteria Number of Firms 
Firms in the industries with SIC code 100-3999, 5000-5999, and 
7000-9999 5325 
Less:  
   Within industry (4-digit SIC code) whose number of firms  ≥ 30 (3002) 
   Fiscal-year end in December (497) 
   All financial data available (1387) 
   Earnings report date for years t-1 and t-2 available (171) 
   Union membership data available (2) 
   Blockholder data available in proxy statement (28) 
   Bid-ask spread data available (39) 
   Disclosure data available (37) 
   Not experience a merger of equal (1) 
   Not file for bankruptcy (1) 
   Not change stock exchange (1) 
   Not delist from stock exchange (2) 
      Total 157 
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Table 4: Sample firms 
SIC 
code Industry Name 
No of 
Firms Company Name 
1311 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 1 Navidec Inc 
Pharmacia Corp 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co 
Pfizer Inc 
Johnson & Johnson 
Chiron Corp 
Bausch & Lomb Inc 
MGI Pharma Inc 
Natures Sunshine Products Inc 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Bradley Pharmaceuticals Inc 
United-Guardian Inc 
Reliv International Inc 
Virbac Corp 
Quigley Corp 
King Pharmaceuticals Inc 
Mannatech Inc 
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 17 
Genentech Inc 
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals 2836 Biological Products (No 
Diagnostic Substance)  
2 
Gilead Sciences Inc 
Novellus Systems Inc 
3D Systems Corp 
3559 Special Industry Machinery 3 
Veeco Instruments Inc 
Focus Enhancements Inc 
Performance Technologies Inc 
AESP Inc 
3576 Computer Communications 
Equipment 
4 
Foundry Networks Inc 
Isomet Corp 
Stratasys Inc 
Lexmark International Inc 
3577 Computer Peripheral 
Equipment 
4 
Immersion Corp 
Inter-Tel Inc 
Polycom Inc 
Terayon Communication Systems Inc 
3661 Telephone & Telegraph 
Apparatus 
4 
Tut Systems Inc 
Tekelec 
Merrimac Industries Inc 
Digital Recorders Inc 
Spectralink Corp 
3663 Radio & TV Broadcasting & 
Communications Equipment 
5 
Sonicwall Inc 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Texas Instruments Inc 
Intel Corp 
Advanced Micro Devices 
Actel Corp 
Plx Technology Inc 
3674 Semiconductors & Related 
Devices 
6 
Smartdisk Corp 
Technitrol Inc 
Vicor Corp 
3679 Electronic Components 3 
Nortech Systems Inc 
Gentex Corp 3714 Motor Vehicle Parts & 
Accessories 
2 
Universal Automotive Industries Inc 
Data I/O Corp 
Teradyne Inc 
3825 Instruments for Measures & 
Testing of Electricity & 
Electrical Signals  
3 
Wireless Telecom Group Inc 
FEI Co 
Waters Corp 
3826 Laboratory Analytical 
Instruments 
3 
Molecular Devices Corp 
3842 Orthopedic, Prosthetic & 
Surgical Appliances & Supplies 
1 Invacare Corp 
Spectranetics Corp 
Iridex Corp 
Affymetrix Inc 
3845 Electromedical & 
Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 
4 
Zevex International Inc 
Arden Group Inc 
Weis Markets Inc 
Safeway Inc 
5411 Retail---Grocery Stores 4 
Wild Oats Markets Inc 
McDonald’s Corp 
Wendy’s International Inc 
CEC Entertainment Inc 
O’Charley’s Inc 
Panera Bread Co 
Checkers Drive-In Restaurant 
Lone Star Steakhouse Saloon 
Rare Hospitality International Inc 
Applebees International Inc 
Back Yard Burgers Inc 
Papa Johns International Inc 
Grill Concepts Inc 
Brazil Fast Food Corp 
Famous Daves of America Inc 
5812 Retail---Eating Places 17 
Friendly Ice Cream Corp 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
P F Changs China Bistro Inc 5812 Retail---Eating Places  
Rubio’s  Restaurants Inc 
Blair Corp 
Systemax Inc 
MediaBay Inc 
PC Connection Inc 
5961 Retail---Catalog & Mail-Order 
Houses 
5 
Gaiam Inc 
Computer Horizons Corp 
Manpower Inc 
Administaff Inc 
7363 Services---Help Supply 
Services 
4 
Judge Group Inc 
Earthlink Inc 
Cnet Networks Inc 
Pegasus Solutions Inc 
SM&A Corp 
Costar Group Inc 
Ebay Inc 
Edgar Online Inc 
Onesource Information Services 
Ask Jeeves Inc 
LookSmart LTD 
7370 Services---Computer 
Programming, Data Processing, 
Etc. 
11 
Akamai Technologies Inc 
Borland Software Corp 
THQ Inc 
Intrusion Inc 
Epicor Software Corp 
Peoplesoft Inc 
SPSS Inc 
Business Objects SA 
Applix Inc 
RSA Security Inc 
CenterSpan Communications Corp 
National Instruments Corp 
Legato Systems Inc 
Smith Micro Software Inc 
Advent Software Inc 
Citrix Systems Inc 
Accelrys Inc 
Documentum Inc 
Datatrak International Inc 
Siebel Systems Inc 
7372 Services---Prepackaged 
Software 
38 
Mercator Software Inc 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Realnetworks Inc 
Verisign Inc 
DoubleClick Inc 
MicroStrategy Inc 
Actuate Corp 
Entrust Inc 
Onyx Software Corp 
Vignette Corp 
Informatica Corp 
Marimba Inc 
Sagent Technology Inc 
Primus Knowledge Solutions 
LionBridge Technologies Inc 
Quest Software Inc 
Tumbleweed Communications Co 
Vitria Technology Inc 
BSquare Corp 
7372 Services---Prepackaged 
Software 
 
Interwoven Inc 
Unisys Corp 
Nyfix Inc 
Applied Digital Solutions 
BroadVision Inc 
Sabre Holdings Corp 
Packeteer Inc 
7373 Services---Computer Integrated 
Systems Design 
7 
Cysive Inc 
Cass Information Systems Inc 7389 Services---Business Services, 
NEC 
2 
Freemarkets Inc 
MGM Mirage 
Aztar Corp 
MTR Gaming Group Inc 
Century Casinos Inc 
Ameristar Casinos Inc 
7990 Services---Miscellaneous 
Amusement & Recreation 
6 
Bally Total Fitness Holdings CP 
8731 Services---Commercial 
Physical & Biological Research 
1 Pharmaceutical Product Development 
Inc 
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Table 5: Summary statistics 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
DISC1a 34 45.52 23 1 370 
DISC2a 29 42.10 18 1 334 
DISC3a 30 28.85 21 1 184 
DISC4a 25 25.70 17 1 155 
INFASY -4.45 0.87 -4.55 -6.42 -2.20 
EQUITY 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.98 
BLOCK 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.58 
CONRTO 0.57 0.15 0.52 0.38 0.86 
SPEED 1.50 1.58 1.39 0.11 14.17 
CAPINT 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.02 1.60 
ADVRTO 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.45 
POLITIC 0.59 4.36 0.12 -1.36 53.23 
UNION 0.041 0.052 0.020 0.014 0.367 
SIZEa 7165.03 31017.86 394.96 4.66 250138.5 
LDISC   =  the logarithm of the number of information items disclosed within year t. 
INFASY =  annual average of the logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread, which is the absolute 
value of bid-ask spread scaled by the average of bid and ask, in year t-1. 
EQUITY = the amount raising from issuing common or preferred stock in year t+1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t. 
BLOCK = the percentage of shares held by stockholders that are unaffiliated with management in 
year t. 
CONRTO = the ratio of top-four firms’ sales divided by industrial sales (defined according to 4-digit 
SIC code) in year t. 
SPEED = the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal profits for the industry (defined according 
to 4-digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
CAPINT = gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
ADVRTO = advertising expenses divided by total sales in year t. 
POLITIC = reported tax rate, which equals income taxes divided by the absolute value of pretax 
income in year t. 
UNION = the percentage of employed workers who are union members in the industry (2, 3 or 4-
digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
LSIZE = the logarithm of the multiple of common shares outstanding and the stock price at the end 
of year t. 
 
a. DISC1, DISC2, DISC3, DISC4, and SIZE information are provided only for summary statistics.  In the 
regression, the logarithms of these values (LDISC1, LDISC2, LDISC3, LDISC4 and LSIZE) are used.  
DISC1 includes all the information items disclosed.  DISC2 includes only the proprietary information items 
disclosed.  DISC3 includes all the information items disclosed, and only within the announcements that can 
be clearly identified as initiated by management.  DISC4 includes only the proprietary information items 
disclosed, and only within the announcements that can be clearly identified as initiated by management. 
SIZE is the multiple of common shares outstanding and the stock price at the end of year t.  SIZE figures 
are in million. 
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Table 6: Number of information items by industry 
Panel A: All announcements, initiated by management and quoted from management 
(DISC1) 
SIC code 
Number of 
firms Mean Minimum Maximum 
1311 1 1   
2834 17 35 2 89 
2836 2 24 21 26 
3559 3 22 21 24 
3576 4 30 7 56 
3577 4 18 8 28 
3661 4 29 14 46 
3663 5 24 19 32 
3674 6 116 13 370 
3679 3 11 4 16 
3714 2 16 7 24 
3825 3 30 5 70 
3826 3 18 8 28 
3842 1 27   
3845 4 18 8 33 
5411 4 16 1 27 
5812 17 15 2 48 
5961 5 10 2 17 
7363 4 20 8 36 
7370 11 36 1 97 
7372 38 55 1 314 
7373 7 37 4 95 
7389 2 6 3 9 
7990 6 14 4 23 
8731 1 7   
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Proprietary announcements, initiated by management and quoted from 
management (DISC2) 
SIC code 
Number of 
firms Mean Minimum Maximum 
1311 1 1   
2834 17 28 2 70 
2836 2 22 17 26 
3559 3 16 12 19 
3576 4 26 4 49 
3577 4 17 8 26 
3661 4 25 7 41 
3663 5 20 17 23 
3674 6 104 11 334 
3679 3 8 4 14 
3714 2 11 1 21 
3825 3 27 3 63 
3826 3 14 6 26 
3842 1 18   
3845 4 17 8 31 
5411 4 8 1 16 
5812 17 12 1 35 
5961 5 7 1 15 
7363 4 16 7 30 
7370 11 31 1 90 
7372 38 49 1 306 
7373 7 32 3 88 
7389 2 6 2 9 
7990 6 8 1 15 
8731 1 7   
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: All announcements, initiated by management only (DISC3) 
SIC code 
Number of 
firms Mean Minimum Maximum 
1311 1 1   
2834 17 32 2 81 
2836 2 24 21 26 
3559 3 21 19 24 
3576 4 22 7 38 
3577 4 13 5 26 
3661 4 25 6 45 
3663 5 21 9 30 
3674 6 68 9 184 
3679 3 11 4 16 
3714 2 16 7 24 
3825 3 28 5 65 
3826 3 18 8 28 
3842 1 24   
3845 4 17 4 33 
5411 4 15 1 25 
5812 17 15 2 48 
5961 5 10 2 17 
7363 4 20 8 34 
7370 11 32 1 79 
7372 38 47 1 146 
7373 7 36 4 93 
7389 2 6 3 9 
7990 6 14 4 23 
8731 1 7   
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Proprietary announcements, initiated by management only (DISC4) 
SIC code 
Number of 
firms Mean Minimum Maximum 
1311 1 1   
2834 17 26 2 66 
2836 2 22 17 26 
3559 3 16 10 19 
3576 4 19 4 33 
3577 4 12 5 24 
3661 4 21 5 40 
3663 5 18 7 23 
3674 6 59 8 155 
3679 3 8 4 14 
3714 2 11 1 21 
3825 3 26 3 60 
3826 3 14 6 26 
3842 1 16   
3845 4 16 4 31 
5411 4 7 1 14 
5812 17 11 1 35 
5961 5 7 1 15 
7363 4 15 7 28 
7370 11 27 1 72 
7372 38 41 1 132 
7373 7 32 3 86 
7389 2 6 2 9 
7990 6 8 1 15 
8731 1 7   
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Table 7: Pearson correlations among variables 
 
 LDISC1 LDISC2 LDISC3 LDISC4 INFASY EQUITY BLOCK LOEPS CONRTO SPEED CAPINT ADVRTO POLITIC UNION 
LDISC2 0.958 
(0.001) 
             
LDISC3 0.985 
(0.001) 
0.940 
(0.001) 
            
LDISC4 0.938 
(0.001) 
0.985 
(0.001) 
0.948 
(0.001) 
           
INFASY -0.571 
(0.001) 
-0.602 
(0.001) 
-0.553 
(0.001) 
-0.578 
(0.001) 
          
EQUITY -0.084 
(0.298) 
-0.073 
(0.365) 
-0.081 
(0.315) 
-0.073 
(0.361) 
0.084 
(0.293) 
         
BLOCK -0.109 
(0.174) 
-0.108 
(0.179) 
-0.097 
(0.226) 
-0.099 
(0.218) 
-0.121 
(0.130) 
0.118 
(0.140) 
        
LOEPS 0.053 
(0.509) 
0.072 
(0.373) 
0.054 
(0.503) 
0.066 
(0.409) 
-0.121 
(0.131) 
0.107 
(0.181) 
0.052 
(0.517) 
       
CONRTO -0.107 
(0.183) 
-0.086 
(0.285) 
-0.131 
(0.102) 
-0.108 
(0.178) 
0.142 
(0.076) 
-0.002 
(0.977) 
0.044 
(0.583) 
0.020 
(0.804) 
      
SPEED -0.125 
(0.118) 
-0.096 
(0.233) 
-0.115 
(0.150) 
-0.083 
(0.303) 
-0.022 
(0.789) 
0.023 
(0.776) 
-0.085 
(0.292) 
-0.033 
(0.679) 
-0.089 
(0.266) 
     
CAPINT -0.218 
(0.006) 
-0.276 
(0.001) 
-0.202 
(0.011) 
-0.269 
(0.001) 
0.254 
(0.001) 
-0.021 
(0.791) 
0.057 
(0.477) 
-0.059 
(0.466) 
-0.106 
(0.187) 
-0.114 
(0.157) 
    
ADVRTO -0.047 
(0.563) 
-0.086 
(0.287) 
-0.040 
(0.619) 
-0.077 
(0.336) 
0.062 
(0.440) 
0.511 
(0.001) 
0.038 
(0.635) 
0.018 
(0.820) 
-0.097 
(0.226) 
0.010 
(0.897) 
-0.064 
(0.426) 
   
POLITIC 0.155 
(0.053) 
0.152 
(0.058) 
0.155 
(0.052) 
0.153 
(0.056) 
-0.088 
(0.272) 
-0.013 
(0.870) 
0.051 
(0.529) 
0.060 
(0.453) 
-0.064 
(0.425) 
0.005 
(0.946) 
-0.047 
(0.560) 
-0.043 
(0.589) 
  
UNION -0.095 
(0.236) 
-0.178 
(0.026) 
-0.099 
(0.219) 
-0.191 
(0.017) 
0.031 
(0.698) 
-0.042 
(0.598) 
-0.064 
(0.424) 
0.073 
(0.363) 
0.063 
(0.430) 
-0.080 
(0.319) 
0.146 
(0.069) 
-0.142 
(0.075) 
-0.038 
(0.634) 
 
LSIZE 0.572 
(0.001) 
0.547 
(0.001) 
0.561 
(0.001) 
0.530 
(0.001) 
-0.782 
(0.001) 
-0.097 
(0.227) 
0.012 
(0.877) 
0.012 
(0.879) 
-0.166 
(0.038) 
-0.014 
(0.862) 
-0.075 
(0.349) 
-0.038 
(0.633) 
0.069 
(0.391) 
0.075 
(0.349) 
p-values for two-tailed tests are provided in parentheses. 
Number of observations = 157 
 
LDISC   =  the logarithm of the number of information items disclosed within year t. 
INFASY =  annual average of the logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread, which is the absolute value of bid-ask spread scaled by the average of bid 
and ask, in year t-1. 
EQUITY = the amount raising from issuing common or preferred stock in year t+1 divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
BLOCK = the percentage of shares held by stockholders that are unaffiliated with management in year t. 
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LOEPS =  1 if basic earnings per share in year t is less than basic earnings per share in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
CONRTO = the ratio of top-four firms’ sales divided by industrial sales (defined according to 4-digit SIC code) in year t. 
SPEED = the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal profits for the industry (defined according to 4-digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
CAPINT = gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
ADVRTO = advertising expenses divided by total sales in year t. 
POLITIC = reported tax rate, which equals income taxes divided by the absolute value of pretax income in year t. 
UNION = the percentage of employed workers who are union members in the industry (2, 3 or 4-digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
LSIZE = the logarithm of the multiple of common shares outstanding and the stock price at the end of year t. 
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Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for year 2001: initiated by 
management and quoted from management 
25 industries, 157 firm-observations: disclosure variable includes announcements that are 
initiated by management and quoted from management 
Model: 
LDISC INFASY EQUITY INFASY EQUITY LITIGAit it it it it it= + + + +− + − +α α α α α0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4*  
+ + + + +α α α α ε5 6 7 8COMPETE POLITIC UNION LSIZEit it it it it  
Panel A: disclosure variable: number of all information items (LDISC1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.4686 
(0.84) 
0.6826 
(1.55) 
0.7946 
(1.63) 
0.5262 
(1.18) 
INFASY -0.4057 
(-2.84)* 
-0.4217 
(-3.01)* 
-0.3468 
(-2.34)* 
-0.4039 
(-2.83)* 
EQUITY -2.2292 
(-0.44) 
-2.8850 
(-0.59) 
-2.1146 
(-0.43) 
-2.0989 
(-0.41) 
INFASY*EQUITY -0.5425 
(-0.42) 
-0.7283 
(-0.58) 
-0.5004 
(-0.39) 
-0.5301 
(-0.41) 
LITIGA 
  BLOCK -1.3252 
(-2.51)** 
-1.4455 
(-2.79)** 
-1.2275 
(-2.33)** 
-1.3232 
(-2.51)** 
  LOEPS 0.0519 
(0.35) 
0.0390 
(0.27) 
0.0503 
(0.34) 
0.0519 
(0.35) 
COMPETE 
  CONRTO 0.0721 
(0.15) 
   
  SPEED  -0.1116 
(-2.49)** 
  
  CAPINT   -0.3039 
(-1.34) 
 
  ADVRTO    -0.2725 
(-0.19) 
POLITIC 0.0278 
(1.68)* 
0.0279 
(1.73)* 
0.0270 
(1.65) 
0.0275 
(1.67)* 
UNION -2.6215 
(-1.86)* 
-2.8606 
(-2.07)* 
-2.3821 
(-1.69)* 
-2.6477 
(-1.86)* 
LSIZE 0.1576 
(3.07)* 
0.1500 
(2.99)* 
0.1706 
(3.29)* 
0.1576 
(3.08)* 
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.407 0.389 0.382 
F Value 11.69 12.87 12.03 11.70 
Pr > F <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Panel B: disclosure variable: number of proprietary information items (LDISC2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.5576 
(-0.94) 
-0.1847 
(-0.39) 
0.0600 
(0.12) 
-0.2882 
(-0.61) 
INFASY -0.6275 
(-4.12)* 
-0.6382 
(-4.26)* 
-0.5377 
(-3.42)* 
-0.6189 
(-4.09)* 
EQUITY -0.5980 
(-0.11) 
-1.6641 
(-0.32) 
-0.8025 
(-0.15) 
0.6111 
(0.11) 
INFASY*EQUITY -0.1448 
(-0.11) 
-0.4335 
(-0.32) 
-0.1773 
(-0.13) 
0.0212 
(0.02) 
LITIGA 
  BLOCK -1.6429 
(-2.92)** 
-1.7390 
(-3.13)** 
-1.4838 
(-2.65)** 
-1.6433 
(-2.94)** 
  LOEPS 0.0835 
(0.52) 
0.0732 
(0.47) 
0.0830 
(0.53) 
0.0821 
(0.52) 
COMPETE 
  CONRTO 0.3124 
(0.60) 
   
  SPEED  -0.1073 
(-2.24)** 
  
  CAPINT   -0.4429 
(-1.84) 
 
  ADVRTO    -1.8580 
(-1.24) 
POLITIC 0.0286 
(1.63) 
0.0283 
(1.64) 
0.0272 
(1.56) 
0.0271 
(1.55) 
UNION -4.6658 
(-3.10)* 
-4.8497 
(-3.27)* 
-4.2777 
(-2.86)* 
-4.8784 
(-3.23)* 
LSIZE 0.1172 
(2.15)* 
0.1075 
(2.00)* 
0.1341 
(2.44)* 
0.1189 
(2.19)* 
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.438 0.432 0.425 
F Value 13.56 14.50 14.17 13.79 
Pr > F <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
T-values are reported in parenthesis 
*: statistically significant at 5% level, one-tailed test 
**: statistically significant at 5% level, two-tailed test 
 
LDISC   =  the logarithm of the number of information items disclosed within year t. 
INFASY =  annual average of the logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread, which is the absolute 
value of bid-ask spread scaled by the average of bid and ask, in year t-1. 
EQUITY = the amount raising from issuing common or preferred stock in year t+1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t. 
BLOCK = the percentage of shares held by stockholders that are unaffiliated with management in 
year t. 
LOEPS =  1 if basic earnings per share in year t is less than basic earnings per share in year t-1, 0 
otherwise. 
CONRTO = the ratio of top-four firms’ sales divided by industrial sales (defined according to 4-digit 
SIC code) in year t. 
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SPEED = the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal profits for the industry (defined according 
to 4-digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
CAPINT = gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
ADVRTO = advertising expenses divided by total sales in year t. 
POLITIC = reported tax rate, which equals income taxes divided by the absolute value of pretax 
income in year t. 
UNION = the percentage of employed workers who are union members in the industry (2, 3 or 4-
digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
LSIZE = the logarithm of the multiple of common shares outstanding and the stock price at the end 
of year t. 
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Table 9: Refined Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for year 2001: initiated 
by management 
25 industries, 157 observations, disclosure variable includes only the announcements that 
are initiated by management 
Model: 
LDISC INFASY EQUITY INFASY EQUITY LITIGAit it it it it it= + + + +− + − +α α α α α0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4*  
+ + + + +α α α α ε5 6 7 8COMPETE POLITIC UNION LSIZEit it it it it  
Panel A: disclosure variable: number of all information items (LDISC3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.7333 
(1.34) 
0.7872 
(1.81) 
0.8749 
(1.82) 
0.6447 
(1.47) 
INFASY -0.3469 
(-2.47)* 
-0.3651 
(-2.65)* 
-0.3008 
(-2.06)* 
-0.3493 
(-2.49)* 
EQUITY -2.5739 
(-0.52) 
-2.8020 
(-0.58) 
-2.1255 
(-0.44) 
-2.1964 
(-0.43) 
INFASY*EQUITY -0.6286 
(-0.50) 
-0.7041 
(-0.57) 
-0.5041 
(-0.40) 
-0.5439 
(-0.43) 
LITIGA 
  BLOCK -1.1487 
(-2.22)** 
-1.2719 
(-2.49)** 
-1.0815 
(-2.08)** 
-1.1615 
(-2.25)** 
  LOEPS 0.0597 
(0.41) 
0.0465 
(0.32) 
0.0567 
(0.39) 
0.0582 
(0.40) 
COMPETE 
  CONRTO -0.1350 
(-0.28) 
   
  SPEED  -0.0995 
(-2.26)** 
  
  CAPINT   -0.2578 
(-1.15) 
 
  ADVRTO    -0.1425 
(-0.10) 
POLITIC 0.0289 
(1.78)* 
0.0294 
(1.85)* 
0.0286 
(1.77)* 
0.0290 
(1.79)* 
UNION -2.5887 
(-1.87)* 
-2.8397 
(-2.08)* 
-2.4228 
(-1.75)* 
-2.6351 
(-1.88)* 
LSIZE 0.1563 
(3.11)* 
0.1516 
(3.07)* 
0.1693 
(3.33)* 
0.1580 
(3.15)* 
Adjusted R2 0.361 0.382 0.366 0.361 
F Value 10.79 11.71 11.02 10.77 
Pr > F <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Panel B: disclosure variable: number of proprietary information items (LDISC4) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.2568 
(-0.43) 
-0.0495 
(-0.10) 
0.2041 
(0.39) 
-0.1388 
(-0.29) 
INFASY -0.5609 
(-3.69)* 
-0.5735 
(-3.83)* 
-0.4776 
(-3.05)* 
-0.5567 
(-3.69)* 
EQUITY -0.5632 
(-0.10) 
-1.1857 
(-0.23) 
-0.4000 
(-0.08) 
0.8197 
(0.15) 
INFASY*EQUITY -0.1199 
(-0.09) 
-0.2939 
(-0.22) 
-0.0600 
(-0.04) 
0.1062 
(0.08) 
LITIGA 
  BLOCK -1.4813 
(-2.64)** 
-1.5786 
(-2.84)** 
-1.3430 
(-2.41)** 
-1.4957 
(-2.68)** 
  LOEPS 0.0810 
(0.51) 
0.0706 
(0.45) 
0.0788 
(0.50) 
0.0783 
(0.49) 
COMPETE 
  CONRTO 0.1013 
(0.20) 
   
  SPEED  -0.0934 
(-1.95) 
  
  CAPINT   -0.4301 
(-1.79) 
 
  ADVRTO    -1.6436 
(-1.10) 
POLITIC 0.0299 
(1.71)* 
0.0300 
(1.73)* 
0.0289 
(1.67)* 
0.0289 
(1.65) 
UNION -4.8367 
(-3.22)* 
-5.0291 
(-3.39)* 
-4.4981 
(-3.01)* 
-5.0579 
(-3.35)* 
LSIZE 0.1178 
(2.16)* 
0.1111 
(2.07)* 
0.1363 
(2.49)* 
0.1211 
(2.23)* 
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.407 0.405 0.397 
F Value 12.19 12.92 12.80 12.41 
Pr > F <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
T-value is reported in parenthesis 
*: statistically significant at 5% level, one-tailed test 
**: statistically significant at 5% level, two-tailed test 
 
LDISC   =  the logarithm of the number of information items disclosed within year t. 
INFASY =  annual average of the logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread, which is the absolute 
value of bid-ask spread scaled by the average of bid and ask, in year t-1. 
EQUITY = the amount raising from issuing common or preferred stock in year t+1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t. 
BLOCK = the percentage of shares held by stockholders that are unaffiliated with management in 
year t. 
LOEPS =  1 if basic earnings per share in year t is less than basic earnings per share in year t-1, 0 
otherwise. 
CONRTO = the ratio of top-four firms’ sales divided by industrial sales (defined according to 4-digit 
SIC code) in year t. 
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SPEED = the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal profits for the industry (defined according 
to 4-digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
CAPINT = gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
ADVRTO = advertising expenses divided by total sales in year t 
POLITIC = reported tax rate, which equals income taxes divided by the absolute value of pretax 
income in year t.  
UNION = the percentage of employed workers who are union members in the industry (2, 3 or 4-
digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
LSIZE = the logarithm of the multiple of common shares outstanding and the stock price at the end 
of year t. 
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Table 10: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for year 2002: initiated by 
management and quoted from management 
18 industries, 60 firm-observations: disclosure variable includes announcements that are 
initiated by management and quoted from management 
Model: 
LDISC INFASY EQUITY INFASY EQUITY LITIGAit it it it it it= + + + +− + − +α α α α α0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 4*  
+ + + + +α α α α ε5 6 7 8COMPETE POLITIC UNION LSIZEit it it it it  
Panel A: disclosure variable: number of all information items (LDISC1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.4295 
(0.56) 
1.6604 
(3.08) 
1.0632 
(1.77) 
1.2150 
(2.09) 
INFASY -0.2138 
(-1.48) 
-0.1355 
(-0.99) 
-0.2134 
(-1.45) 
-0.2030 
(-1.39) 
EQUITY 18.8107 
(1.95)* 
18.3908 
(2.13)* 
15.3342 
(1.64) 
12.2616 
(1.19) 
INFASY*EQUITY 3.5911 
(1.78)* 
3.4953 
(1.96)* 
2.7854 
(1.45) 
2.0710 
(0.95) 
LITIGA 
  BLOCK -0.2564 
(-0.36) 
-0.2906 
(-0.44) 
-0.1513 
(-0.21) 
-0.2683 
(-0.37) 
  LOEPS 0.1175 
(0.57) 
0.0914 
(0.48) 
0.1264 
(0.60) 
0.1020 
(0.48) 
COMPETE 
  CONRTO 0.8645 
(1.19) 
   
  SPEED  -0.8398 
(-3.03)** 
  
  CAPINT   0.0196 
(0.06) 
 
  ADVRTO    -3.2039 
(-0.68) 
POLITIC -0.2463 
(-1.38) 
-0.1997 
(-1.19) 
-0.2571 
(-1.39) 
-0.2585 
(-1.43) 
UNION -3.8761 
(-1.90)* 
-3.7492 
(-1.98)* 
-3.6023 
(-1.75)* 
-4.0423 
(-1.88)* 
LSIZE 0.2551 
(2.93)* 
0.3226 
(3.85)* 
0.2231 
(2.66)* 
0.2260 
(2.70)* 
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.404 0.295 0.301 
F Value 4.00 5.45 3.74 3.82 
Pr > F 0.0007 <0.0001 0.0012 0.0010 
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Panel B: disclosure variable: number of proprietary information items (LDISC2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.3966 
(0.48) 
1.4374 
(2.49) 
0.7377 
(1.15) 
0.9586 
(1.54) 
INFASY -0.2111 
(-1.36) 
-0.1288 
(-0.88) 
-0.2142 
(-1.37) 
-0.2006 
(-1.28) 
EQUITY 16.7895 
(1.62) 
17.7613 
(1.93)* 
14.7870 
(1.48) 
11.4634 
(1.04) 
INFASY*EQUITY 3.0102 
(1.39) 
3.23225 
(1.70)* 
2.4878 
(1.21) 
1.7696 
(0.76) 
LITIGA 
  BLOCK 0.0383 
(0.05) 
-0.0403 
(-0.06) 
0.1030 
(0.13) 
-0.0098 
(-0.01) 
  LOEPS 0.0626 
(0.28) 
0.0317 
(0.15) 
0.0712 
(0.32) 
0.0443 
(0.20) 
COMPETE 
  CONRTO 0.5670 
(0.73) 
   
  SPEED  -0.8874 
(-3.00)** 
  
  CAPINT   0.1121 
(0.32) 
 
  ADVRTO    -3.1957 
(-0.63) 
POLITIC -0.3287 
(-1.71)* 
-0.2759 
(-1.54) 
-0.3471 
(-1.76)* 
-0.3378 
(-1.75)* 
UNION -3.4540 
(-1.57) 
-3.4314 
(-1.70)* 
-3.2971 
(-1.50) 
-3.7148 
(-1.62) 
LSIZE 0.2425 
(2.59)* 
0.3267 
(3.65)* 
0.2229 
(2.49)* 
0.2244 
(2.52)* 
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.388 0.279 0.284 
F Value 3.62 5.16 3.54 3.59 
Pr > F 0.0016 <0.0001 0.0018 0.0016 
T-values are reported in parenthesis 
*: statistically significant at 5% level, one-tailed test 
**: statistically significant at 5% level, two-tailed test 
 
LDISC   =  the logarithm of the number of information items disclosed within year t. 
INFASY =  annual average of the logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread, which is the absolute 
value of bid-ask spread scaled by the average of bid and ask, in year t-1. 
EQUITY = the amount raising from issuing common or preferred stock in year t+1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t. 
BLOCK = the percentage of shares held by stockholders that are unaffiliated with management in 
year t. 
LOEPS =  1 if basic earnings per share in year t is less than basic earnings per share in year t-1, 0 
otherwise. 
CONRTO = the ratio of top-four firms’ sales divided by industrial sales (defined according to 4-digit 
SIC code) in year t. 
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SPEED = the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal profits for the industry (defined according 
to 4-digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
CAPINT = gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets at the end of year t. 
ADVRTO = advertising expenses divided by total sales in year t. 
POLITIC = reported tax rate, which equals income taxes divided by the absolute value of pretax 
income in year t. 
UNION = the percentage of employed workers who are union members in the industry (2, 3 or 4-
digit SIC code) the firm operates in year t. 
LSIZE = the logarithm of the multiple of common shares outstanding and the stock price at the end 
of year t. 
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